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ABSTRACT 
 
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) are increasingly popular in the social sciences, 
not only in medicine.  We argue that the lay public, and sometimes researchers, put 
too much trust in RCTs over other methods of investigation. Contrary to frequent 
claims in the applied literature, randomization does not equalize everything other 
than the treatment in the treatment and control groups, it does not automatically 
deliver a precise estimate of the average treatment effect (ATE), and it does not re-
lieve us of the need to think about (observed or unobserved) covariates. Finding out 
whether an estimate was generated by chance is more difficult than commonly be-
lieved. At best, an RCT yields an unbiased estimate, but this property is of limited 
practical value. Even then, estimates apply only to the sample selected for the trial, 
often no more than a convenience sample, and justification is required to extend the 
results to other groups, including any population to which the trial sample belongs, 
or to any individual, including an individual in the trial. Demanding ‘external valid-
ity’ is unhelpful because it expects too much of an RCT while undervaluing its poten-
tial contribution. RCTs do indeed require minimal assumptions and can operate 
with little prior knowledge. This is an advantage when persuading distrustful audi-
ences, but it is a disadvantage for cumulative scientific progress, where prior 
knowledge should be built upon, not discarded. RCTs can play a role in building sci-
entific knowledge and useful predictions but they can only do so as part of a cumula-
tive program, combining with other methods, including conceptual and theoretical 
development, to discover not ‘what works’, but ‘why things work’.  
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Introduction  
 
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are widely encouraged as the ideal methodol-
ogy for causal inference. This has long been true in medicine (e.g. for drug trials by 
the FDA.  A notable exception is the recent paper by Frieden (2017), ex-director of 
the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, who lists key limitations of 
RCTs as well as a range of contexts where RCTs, even when feasible, are dominated 
by other methods. Earlier critiques in medicine include Feinstein and Horwitz 
(1997), Concato, Shah, and Horwitz (2000), Rawlins (2008), and Concato (2013).) It 
is also increasingly true in other health sciences and across the social sciences, in-
cluding psychology, economics, education, political science, and sociology. Among 
both researchers and the general public, RCTs are perceived to yield causal infer-
ences and estimates of average treatment effects (ATEs) that are more reliable and 
more credible than those from any other empirical method. They are taken to be 
largely exempt from the myriad problems that characterize observational studies, to 
require minimal substantive assumptions, little or no prior information, and to be 
largely independent of ‘expert’ knowledge that is often regarded as manipulable, po-
litically biased, or otherwise suspect. They are also sometimes felt to be more re-
sistant to researcher and publisher degrees of freedom (for example through p-
hacking, selective analyses, or publication bias) than non-randomized studies given 
that trial registration and pre-specified analysis plans are mandatory or at least the 
norm. 
We argue that any special status for RCTs is unwarranted. Which method is 
most likely to yield a good causal inference depends on what we are trying to dis-
cover as well as on what is already known. When little prior knowledge is available, 
no method is likely to yield well-supported conclusions. This paper is not a criticism 
of RCTs in and of themselves, nor does it propose any hierarchy of evidence, nor at-
tempt to identify good and bad studies. Instead, we will argue that, depending on 
what we want to discover, why we want to discover it, and what we already know, 
there will often be superior routes of investigation and, for a great many questions 
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where RCTs can help, a great deal of other work—empirical, theoretical, and con-
ceptual—needs to be done to make the results of an RCT serviceable.  
Our arguments are intended not only for those who are innocent of the tech-
nicalities of causal inference but also aim to offer something to those who are well 
versed with the field. Most of what is in the paper is known to someone in some sub-
ject. But what epidemiology knows is not what is known by economics, or political 
science, or sociology, or philosophy—and the reverse. The literatures on RCTs in 
these areas are overlapping but often quite different; each uses its own language 
and different understandings and misunderstandings characterize different fields 
and different kinds of projects. We highlight issues arising across a range of disci-
plines where we have observed misunderstanding among serious researchers and 
research users, even if not shared by all experts in those fields. Although we aim for 
a broad cross-disciplinary perspective, we will, given our own disciplinary back-
grounds, be most at home with how these issues arise in economics and how they 
have been treated by philosophers. 
We present two sets of arguments. The first is an enquiry into the idea that 
ATEs estimated from RCTS are likely to be closer to the truth than those estimated 
in other ways. The second explores how to use the results of RCTs once we have 
them.  
In the first section, our discussion runs in familiar statistical terms of bias 
and precision, or efficiency, or expected loss. Unbiasedness means being right on av-
erage, where the average is taken over an infinite number of repetitions using the 
same set of subjects in the trial, but with no limits on how far any one estimate is 
from the truth, while precision means being close to the truth on average; an estima-
tor that is far from the truth in one direction half of the time and equally far from the 
truth in the other direction half of the time is unbiased, but it is imprecise. We re-
view the difference between balance of covariates in expectation versus balance in a 
single run of the experiment (sometimes called ‘random confounding’ or `realized 
confounding’ in epidemiology, see for instance Greenland and Mansournia (2015) or 
VanderWeele (2012)) and the related distinction between precision and unbiased-
ness. These distinctions should be well known wherever RCTs are conducted or RCT 
 5 
results are used, though much of the discussion is, if not confused, unhelpfully im-
precise. Even less recognized are problems with statistical inference, and especially 
the threat to significance testing posed when there is an asymmetric distribution of 
individual treatment effects in the study population.  
The second section describes several different ways to use the evidence from 
RCTs. The types of use we identify have analogues, with different labels, across dis-
ciplines. This section stresses the importance for using RCT results of being clear 
about the hypothesis at stake and the purpose of the investigation. It argues that in 
the usual literature, which stresses extrapolation and generalization, RCTs are both 
under- and over-sold. Oversold because extrapolating or generalizing RCT results 
requires a great deal of additional information that cannot come from RCTs; under-
sold, because RCTs can serve many more purposes than predicting that results ob-
tained in a trial population will hold elsewhere.   
One might be tempted to label the two sections ‘Internal validity’ and ‘Exter-
nal validity’. We resist this, especially in the way that external validity is often char-
acterized. RCTs are under-sold when external validity means that the ‘the same ATE 
holds in this new setting’, or ‘the ATE from the trial holds generally’, or even that the 
ATE in a new setting can be calculated in some reasonable way from that in the 
study population.  RCT results can be useful much more broadly. RCTs are oversold 
when their non-parametric and theory-free nature, which is arguably an advantage 
in estimation or internal validity, is used as an argument for their usefulness. The 
lack of structure is often a disadvantage when we try to use the results outside of 
the context in which the results were obtained; credibility in estimation can lead to 
incredibility in use. You cannot know how to use trial results without first under-
standing how the results from RCTs relate to the knowledge that you already pos-
sess about the world, and much of this knowledge is obtained by other methods. 
Once RCTs are located within this broader structure of knowledge and inference, 
and when they are designed to enhance it, they can be enormously useful, not just 
for warranting claims of effectiveness but for scientific progress more generally. Cu-
mulative science is difficult; so too is reliable prediction about what will happen 
when we act.  
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Nothing we say in the paper should be taken as a general argument against 
RCTs; we simply try to challenge unjustifiable claims and expose misunderstand-
ings. We are not against RCTs, only magical thinking about them. The misunder-
standings are important because they contribute to the common perception that 
RCTs always provide the strongest evidence for causality and for effectiveness and 
because they detract from the usefulness of RCT evidence as part of more general 
scientific projects. In particular, we do not try to rank RCTs versus other methods. 
What methods are best to use and in what combinations depends on the exact ques-
tion at stake, the kind of background assumptions that can be acceptably employed, 
and what the costs are of different kinds of mistakes. By getting clear in Section 1 
just what an RCT, qua RCT, can and cannot deliver, and laying out in Section 2 a vari-
ety of ways in which the information secured in an RCT can be used, we hope to ex-
pose how unavailing is the ‘head-to-head between methods’ discourse that often 
surrounds evidence-ranking schemes. 
  
Section 1: Do RCTs give good estimates of Average Treatment Effects 
We start from a trial sample, a collection of subjects that will be allocated randomly 
to either the treatment or control arm of the trial. This ‘sample’ might be, but rarely 
is, a random sample from some population of interest. More frequently, it is selected 
in some way, for example to those willing to participate, or is simply a convenience 
sample that is available to the those conducting the trial. Given random allocation to 
treatments and controls, the data from the trial allow the identification of the two 
(marginal) distributions, 𝐹1(𝑌1) and 𝐹0(𝑌0), of outcomes 𝑌1 and 𝑌0 in the treated and 
untreated cases within the trial sample. The ATE estimate is the difference in means 
of the two distributions and is the focus of much of the literature in social science 
and medicine.  
Policy makers and researchers may be interested in features of the two mar-
ginal distributions and not simply the ATE, which is our main focus here. For exam-
ple, if Y is disease burden, measured perhaps in QALYs, public health officials may 
be interested in whether a treatment reduced inequality in disease burden, or in 
what it did to the 10th or 90th percentiles of the distribution, even though different 
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people occupy those percentiles in the treatment and control distributions. Econo-
mists are routinely concerned with the 90/10 ratio in the income distribution, and 
in how a policy might affect it (see Bitler et al. (2006) for a related example in US 
welfare policy). Cancer trials standardly use the median difference in survival, 
which compares the times until half the patients have died in each arm. More com-
prehensively, policy makers may wish to compare expected utilities for treated and 
untreated under the two distributions and consider optimal expected-utility maxim-
izing treatment rules conditional on the characteristics of subjects (see Manski 
(2004) and Manski and Tetenov (2016); Bhattacharya and Dupas (2012) give an ap-
plication.) These other kinds of information are important, but we focus on ATEs 
and do not consider these other uses of RCTs further in this paper.   
  
1.1 Estimating average treatment effects 
 A useful way to think about the estimation of treatment effects is to use a schematic 
linear causal model of the form:  
   (1) 
where,  is the outcome for unit i (which may be a person, a village, a hospital 
ward),  𝑇𝑖 is a dichotomous (1,0) treatment dummy indicating whether or not i is 
treated, and 𝛽𝑖 is the individual treatment effect of the treatment on i: it represents 
(or regulates) how much a value t of T contributes to the outcome Y for individual i.   
The x’s are observed or unobserved other linear causes of the outcome, and we sup-
pose that (1) captures a minimal set of causes of 𝑌𝑖 sufficient to fix its value. J may be 
(very) large. The unrestricted heterogeneity of the individual treatment effects, 𝛽𝑖, 
allows the possibility that the treatment interacts with the x’s or other variables, so 
that the effects of T can depend on (be modified by) any other variables. Note that 
we do not need i subscripts on the 𝛾’s that control the effects of the other causes; if 
their effects differ across individuals, we include the interactions of individual char-
acteristics with the original x’s as new x’s. Given that the x’s can be unobservable, 
this is not restrictive. Usage here differs across fields; we shall typically refer to fac-
tors other than T represented on the right-hand side of (1) by the term covariates, 
Yi = biTi + g jxijj=1
J
å
Yi
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while noting that these include both what are sometimes labelled the ‘inde-
pendently operating causes’ (represented by the x’s) as well as ‘effect modifiers’ 
when they interact with the 𝛽′𝑠, a case we shall return to below. They may also cap-
ture the possibility that there are different baselines for different observations. 
We can connect (1) with the counterfactual approach, often referred to as the 
Rubin Causal Model, now common in epidemiology and increasingly so in economics 
(see Rubin (2005), or Hernán (2004) for an exposition for epidemiologists, and 
Freedman (2006) for the history). To illustrate, suppose that T is dichotomous. For 
each unit i there will be two possible outcomes, typically labelled 𝑌𝑖0 and 𝑌𝑖1, the for-
mer occurring if there is no treatment at the time in question, the latter if the unit is 
treated. By inspection of (1), the differences between the two outcomes, 𝑌𝑖1 −
𝑌𝑖0,  are the individual treatment effects, 𝛽𝑖, which are typically different for different 
units. No unit can be both treated and untreated at the same time, so only one or 
other of the outcomes occurs, but not both—the other is counterfactual so that indi-
vidual treatment effects are in principle unobservable.  
The basic theorem from this setup is a remarkable one. It states that the av-
erage treatment effect is the difference between the average outcome in the treat-
ment group minus the average outcome in the control group so that, while we can-
not observe the individual treatment effects, we can observe their mean. The esti-
mate of the average treatment effect is simply the difference between the means in 
the two groups, and it has a standard error that can be estimated using the statisti-
cal theory that applies to the difference of two means, on which more below. The 
difference in means is an unbiased estimator of the mean treatment effect.  The theo-
rem is remarkable because it requires so few assumptions, although it relies on the 
fact that the mean is a linear operator, so that the difference in means is the mean of 
differences. No similar fact is true for other statistics, such as medians, percentiles, 
or variances of treatment effects, none of which can be identified from an RCT with-
out substantive further assumptions, see Deaton (2010, 439) for a simple exposi-
tion. Otherwise, no model is required, no assumptions about covariates, confound-
ers, or other causes are needed, the treatment effects can be heterogeneous, and 
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nothing is required about the shapes of statistical distributions other than the exist-
ence of the counterfactual outcome values.  
Dawid (2000) argues that the existence of counterfactuals is a metaphysical 
assumption that cannot be confirmed (or refuted) by any empirical evidence and is 
controversial because, under some circumstances, there is an unresolvable arbitrar-
iness to causal inference, something that is not true of (1), for example. See also the 
arguments by the empiricist philosopher, Reichenbach (1954), reissued as Reichen-
bach (1976).) In economics, the case for the counterfactual approach is eloquently 
made by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009, Introduction), who emphasize the benefits 
of a theory-free specification with almost unlimited heterogeneity in treatment ef-
fects. Heckman and Vytlacil (2007, Introduction) are equally eloquent on the draw-
backs, noting that the counterfactual approach often leaves us in the dark about the 
exact nature of the treatment, so that the treatment effects can be difficult to link to 
invariant quantities that would be useful elsewhere (invariant in the sense of Hur-
wicz (1966)). 
Consider an experiment that aims to tell us something about the treatment 
effects; this might or might not use randomization. Either way, we can represent the 
treatment group as having 𝑇𝑖 = 1 and the control group as having 𝑇𝑖 = 0.  Given the 
study (or trial) sample, subtracting the average outcomes among the controls from 
the average outcomes among the treatments, we get 
 ?̅?1 − ?̅?0 = ?̅?1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗(
𝐽
𝑗=1
?̅?1𝑖𝑗 −  ?̅?0𝑖𝑗) = ?̅?1  + (𝑆1̅ − 𝑆0̅) (2) 
 The first term on the far-right-hand side of (2), which is the ATE in the treated popu-
lation in the trial sample, is generally the quantity of interest in choosing to conduct 
an RCT, but the second term or error term, which is the sum of the net average bal-
ance of other causes across the two groups, will generally be non-zero and needs to 
be dealt with somehow. We get what we want when the means of all the other 
causes are identical in the two groups, or more precisely (and less onerously) when 
the sum of their net differences 𝑆1̅ − 𝑆0̅ is zero; this is the case of perfect balance. 
With perfect balance, the difference between the two means is exactly equal to the 
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average of the treatment effects among the treated, so that we have the ultimate 
precision in that we know the truth in the trial sample, at least in this linear case. As 
always, the ‘truth’ here refers to the trial sample, and it is always important to be 
aware that the trial sample may not be representative of the population that is ulti-
mately of interest, including the population from which the trial sample comes; any 
such extension requires further argument. 
 How do we get balance, or something close to it? In a laboratory experiment, 
where there is usually much prior knowledge of the other causes, the experimenter 
has a good chance of controlling (or subtracting away the effects of) the other 
causes, aiming to ensure that the last term in (1) is close to zero. Failing such 
knowledge and control, an alternative is matching, which is frequently used in non-
randomized statistical, medical (case-control studies), and econometric studies, (see 
Heckman et al. (1997)). For each subject, a matched subject is found that is as close 
as possible on all suspected causes, so that, once again, the last term in (1) can be 
kept small. When we have a good idea of the causes, matching may also deliver a 
precise estimate. Of course, when there are unknown or unobservable causes that 
have important effects, neither laboratory control nor matching offers protection. 
 What does randomization do? Suppose that no correlations of the x’s with Y 
are introduced post-randomization, for example by subjects not accepting their as-
signment, or by treatment protocols differing from those used for controls. With this 
assumption, randomization provides orthogonality of the treatment to the other 
causes represented in equation (1): Since the treatments and controls come from 
the same underlying distribution, randomization guarantees, by construction, that 
the last term on the right in (1) is zero in expectation. The expectation is taken over 
repeated randomizations on the trial sample, each with its own allocation of treat-
ments and controls. Assuming that our caveat holds, the last term in (2) will be zero 
when averaged over this infinite number of (entirely hypothetical) replications, and 
the average of the estimated ATEs will be the true ATE in the trial sample. So ?̅?1is an 
unbiased estimate of the ATE among the treated in the trial sample, and this is so 
whether or not the causes are observed. Unbiasedness does not require us to know 
anything about covariates, confounders, or other causes, though it does require that 
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they not change after randomization so as to make them correlated with the treat-
ment, an important caveat to which we shall return.  
In any one trial, the difference in means is the average treatment effect 
among those treated plus the term that reflects the randomly generated imbalance 
in the net effects of the other causes. We do not know the size of this error term, and 
there is nothing in randomization that limits its size though, as we discuss below, it 
will tend to be smaller in larger samples. In any single trial, the chance of randomi-
zation can over-represent an important excluded cause(s) in one arm over the 
other, in which case there will be a difference between the means of the two groups 
that is not caused by the treatment. In epidemiology, this is sometimes referred to as 
‘random confounding’, or ‘realized confounding’, a phenomenon that was recog-
nized by Fisher in his agricultural trials. (An instructive example of perfect random 
confounding is constructed by Greenland (1990).) 
If we were to repeat the trial many times, the over-representation of the un-
balanced causes will sometimes be in the treatments and sometimes in the controls. 
The imbalance will vary over replications of the trial, and although we cannot see 
this from our single trial, we should be able to capture its effects on our estimate of 
the ATE from an estimated standard error. This was Fisher’s insight: not that ran-
domization balanced covariates between treatments and controls but that, condi-
tional on the caveat that no post-randomization correlation with covariates occurs, 
randomization provides the basis for calculating the size of the error. Getting the 
standard error and associated significance statements right are of the greatest im-
portance; therein lies the virtue of randomization, not that it yields precise esti-
mates through balance.  
 
1.2 Misunderstandings: claiming too much 
Exactly what randomization does is frequently lost in the practical and popular liter-
ature. There is often confusion between perfect control, on the one hand (as in a la-
boratory experiment or perfect matching with no unobservable causes), and control 
in expectation on the other, which is what randomization contributes. If we knew 
enough about the problem to be able to control well, that is what we would (and 
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should) do. Randomization is an alternative when we do not know enough to con-
trol, but is generally inferior to good control when we do. We suspect that at least 
some of the popular and professional enthusiasm for RCTs, as well as the belief that 
they are precise by construction, comes from misunderstandings about balance or, 
in epidemiological language, about random or realized confounding on the one hand 
and confounding in expectation on the other. These misunderstandings are not so 
much among the researchers who will usually give a correct account when pressed. 
They come from imprecise statements by researchers that are taken literally by the 
lay audience that the researchers are keen to reach, and increasingly successfully. 
Such a misunderstanding is well captured by a quote from the second edition 
of the online manual on impact evaluation jointly issued by the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank and the World Bank (the first, 2011 edition is similar): 
We can be confident that our estimated impact constitutes the true impact of 
the program, since we have eliminated all observed and unobserved factors 
that might otherwise plausibly explain the difference in outcomes. Gertler et 
al. (2016, 69) 
This statement is false, because it confuses actual balance in any single trial with 
balance in expectation over many (hypothetical) trials. If it were true, and if all fac-
tors were indeed controlled (and no imbalances were introduced post randomiza-
tion), the difference would be an exact measure of the average treatment effect 
among the treated in the trial population (at least in the absence of measurement er-
ror). We should not only be confident of our estimate but, as the quote says, we 
would know that it is the truth. Note that the statement contains no reference to 
sample size; we get the truth by virtue of balance, not from a large number of obser-
vations.  
 There are many similar quotes in the economics literature. From the medical 
literature, here is one from a distinguished psychiatrist who is deeply skeptical of 
the use of evidence from RCTs: 
The beauty of a randomized trial is that the researcher does not need to un-
derstand all the factors that influence outcomes. Say that an undiscovered ge-
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netic variation makes certain people unresponsive to medication. The ran-
domizing process will ensure—or make it highly probable—that the arms of 
the trial contain equal numbers of subjects with that variation. The result will 
be a fair test. Kramer (2016,18) 
Claims are made that RCTs reveal knowledge without possibility of error. Judy 
Gueron, the long-time president of MDRC (originally known as the Manpower Devel-
opment Research Corporation), which has been running RCTs on US government 
policy for 45 years, asks why federal and state officials were prepared to support 
randomization in spite of frequent difficulties and in spite of the availability of other 
methods and concludes that it was because “they wanted to learn the truth,” Gueron 
and Rolston (2013, 429). There are many statements of the form “We know that 
[project X] worked because it was evaluated with a randomized trial,” Dynarski 
(2015).  
 It is common to treat the ATE from an RCT as if it were the truth, not just in 
the trial sample but more generally. In economics, a famous example is Lalonde’s 
(1986) study of labor market training programs, whose results were at odds with a 
number of previous non-randomized studies. The paper prompted a large-scale re-
examination of the observational studies to try to bring them into line, though it 
now seems just as likely that the differences lie in the fact that the different study re-
sults apply to different populations (Heckman et al. (1999)). With heterogeneous 
treatment effects, the ATE is only as good as the study sample from which it was ob-
tained. (See Longford and Nelder (1999) who are concerned with the same issue in 
regulating pharmaceuticals. (We return to this in discussing support factors and 
moderator variables in Section 2.2) In epidemiology, Davey-Smith and Ibrahim 
(2002) state that “observational studies propose, RCTs dispose.” Another good ex-
ample is the RCT of hormone replacement therapy (HRT) for post-menopausal 
women. HRT had previously been supported by positive results from a high-quality 
and long-running observational study, but the RCT was stopped in the face of excess 
deaths in the treatment group. The negative result of the RCT led to widespread 
abandonment of the therapy, which might (or might not) have been a mistake (see 
Vandenbroucke (2009) and Frieden (2017)). Yet the medical and popular literature 
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routinely states that the RCT was right and the earlier study wrong, simply because 
the earlier study was not randomized. The gold standard or `truth’ view does harm 
when it undermines the obligation of science to reconcile RCTs results with other 
evidence in a process of cumulative understanding.  
 The false belief in automatic precision suggests that we need pay no atten-
tion to the other causes in (1) or (2). Indeed, Gerber and Green (2012, 5), in their 
standard text for RCTs in political science, note that RCTs are the successful resolu-
tion of investigators’ need for “a research strategy that does not require them to 
identify, let alone measure, all potential confounders.” But the RCT strategy is only 
successful if we are happy with estimates that are arbitrarily far from the truth, just 
so long as the errors cancel out over a series of imaginary experiments. In reality, 
the causality that is being attributed to the treatment might, in fact, be coming from 
an imbalance in some other cause in our particular trial; limiting this requires seri-
ous thought about possible covariates.  
  
1.3 Sample size, balance, and precision 
The literature on the precision of ATEs estimated from RCTs goes back to the very 
beginning. Gosset (writing as ‘Student’) never accepted Fisher’s arguments for ran-
domization in agricultural field trials and argued convincingly that his own non-ran-
dom designs for the placement of treatment and controls yielded more precise esti-
mates of treatment effects (see Student (1938) and Ziliak (2014)). Gosset worked 
for Guinness where inefficiency meant lost revenue, so he had reasons to care, as 
should we. Fisher won the argument in the end, not because Gosset was wrong 
about efficiency, but because, unlike Gosset’s procedures, randomization provides a 
sound basis for statistical inference, and thus for judging whether an estimated ATE 
is different from zero by chance. Moreover, Fisher’s blocking procedures can limit 
the inefficiency from randomization (see Yates (1939)). Gosset’s reservations were 
echoed much later in Savage’s (1962) comment that a Bayesian should not choose 
the allocation of treatments and controls at random but in such a way that, given 
what else is known about the topic and the subjects, their placement reveals the 
most to the researcher. We return to this below. 
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 At the time of randomization and in the absence of post-randomization 
changes in other causes, a trial is more likely to be balanced when the sample size is 
large. As the sample size tends to infinity, the means of the x’s in the treatment and 
control groups will become arbitrarily close. Yet this is of little help in finite sam-
ples. As Fisher (1926) noted: “Most experimenters on carrying out a random assign-
ment will be shocked to find how far from equally the plots distribute themselves,” 
quoted in Morgan and Rubin (2012, 1263). Even with very large sample sizes, if 
there is a large number of causes, balance on each cause may be infeasible. Vanden-
broucke (2004) notes that there are three billion base pairs in the human genome, 
many or all of which could be relevant prognostic factors for the biological outcome 
that we are seeking to influence. It is true, as (2) makes clear, that we do not need 
balance on each cause individually, only on their net effect, the term 𝑆1̅̅ ̅ − 𝑆0̅̅ ̅. But 
consider the human genome base pairs. Out of all those billions, only one might be 
important, and if that one is unbalanced, the results of a single trial can be ‘ran-
domly confounded’ and far from the truth. Statements about large samples guaran-
teeing balance are not useful without guidelines about how large is large enough, 
and such statements cannot be made without knowledge of other causes and how 
they affect outcomes. Of course, lack of balance in the net effect of either observa-
bles or non-observables in (2) does not compromise the inference in an RCT in the 
sense of obtaining a standard error for the unbiased ATE (see Senn (2013) for a par-
ticularly clear statement), although it does clarify the importance of having credible 
standard errors, on which more below. 
 Having run an RCT, it makes good sense to examine any available covariates 
for balance between the treatments and controls; if we suspect that an observed 
variable x is a possible cause, and its means in the two groups are very different, we 
should treat our results with appropriate suspicion. In practice, researchers often 
carry out a statistical test for balance after randomization but before analysis, pre-
sumably with the aim of taking some appropriate action if balance fails. The first ta-
ble of the paper typically presents the sample means of observable covariates for 
the control and treatment groups, together with their differences, and tests for 
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whether or not they are significantly different from zero, either variable by variable, 
or jointly. These tests are appropriate for unbiasedness if we are concerned that the 
random number generator might have failed, or if we are worried that the randomi-
zation is undermined by non-blinded subjects who systematically undermine the al-
location. Otherwise, supposing that no post-randomization correlations are intro-
duced, unbiasedness is guaranteed by the randomization, whatever the test shows, 
and the test is not informative about the balance that would lead to precision; Begg 
(1990, 223) notes, “(I)t is a test of a null hypothesis that is known to be true. There-
fore, if the test turns out to be significant it is, by definition, a false positive.” The 
Consort 2010 updated statement, guideline 15 notes “Unfortunately significance 
tests of baseline differences are still common; they were reported in half of 50 RCTs 
trials published in leading general journals in 1997.” We have not systematically ex-
amined the practice across other social sciences, but it is standard in economics, 
even in high-quality studies in leading journals, such as Banerjee et al. (2015), pub-
lished in Science.   
 Of course, it is always good practice to look for imbalances between observed 
covariates in any single trial using some more appropriate distance measure, for ex-
ample the normalized difference in means (Imbens and Wooldridge (2009, equation 
(3)). Similarly, it would have been good practice for Fisher to abandon a randomiza-
tion in which there were clear patterns in the (random) distribution of plots across 
the field, even though the treatment and control plots were randomly selections 
that, by construction, could not differ ‘significantly’ using the standard (incorrect) 
balance test. Whether such imbalances should be seen as undermining the estimate 
of the ATE depends on our priors about which covariates are likely to be important, 
and how important, which is (not coincidentally) the same thought experiment that 
is routinely undertaken in observational studies when we worry about confounding. 
One procedure to improve balance is to adapt the design before randomiza-
tion, for example, by stratification. Fisher, who as the quote above illustrates, was 
well aware of the loss of precision from randomization argued for ‘blocking’ (strati-
fication) in agricultural trials or for using Latin Squares, both of which restrict the 
amount of imbalance. Stratification, to be useful, requires some prior understanding 
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of the factors that are likely to be important, and so it takes us away from the ‘no 
knowledge required’ or ‘no priors accepted’ appeal of RCTs; it requires thinking 
about and measuring confounders. But as Scriven (1974, 69) notes: “(C)ause hunt-
ing, like lion hunting, is only likely to be successful if we have a considerable amount 
of relevant background knowledge.” Cartwright (1994, Chapter 2) puts it even more 
strongly, “No causes in, no causes out.” Stratification in RCTs, as in other forms of 
sampling, is a standard method for using background knowledge to increase the 
precision of an estimator. It has the further advantage that it allows for the explora-
tion of different ATEs in different strata which can be useful in adapting or trans-
porting the results to other locations (see Section 2). 
 Stratification is not possible if there are too many covariates, or if each has 
many values, so that there are more cells than can be filled given the sample size.  
With five covariates, and ten values on each, and no priors to limit the structure, we 
would have 100,000 possible strata. Filling these is well beyond the sample sizes in 
most trials. An alternative that works more generally is to re-randomize. If the ran-
domization gives an obvious imbalance on known covariates—treatment plots all 
on one side of the field, all the treatment clinics in one region, too many rich and too 
few poor in the control group—we try again, and keep trying until we get a balance 
measured as a small enough distance between the means of the observed covariates 
in the two groups. Morgan and Rubin (2012) suggest the Mahalanobis D–statistic be 
used as a criterion and use Fisher’s randomization inference (to be discussed fur-
ther below) to calculate standard errors that take the re-randomization into ac-
count. An alternative, widely adapted in practice, is to adjust for covariates by run-
ning a regression (or covariance) analysis, with the outcome on the left-hand side 
and the treatment dummy and the covariates as explanatory variables, including 
possible interactions between covariates and treatment dummies. Freedman (2008) 
shows that the adjusted estimate of the ATE is biased in finite samples, with the bias 
depending on the correlation between the squared treatment effect and the covari-
ates. Accepting some bias in exchange for greater precision will often make sense, 
though it certainly undermines any gold standard argument that relies on unbiased-
ness without consideration of precision. 
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1.4 Should we randomize? 
The tension between randomization and precision that goes back to Fisher, Gosset, 
and Savage has been reopened in recent papers by Kasy (2016), Banerjee et al. 
(BCS) (2016) and Banerjee et al. (BCMS) (2017).  
 The trade-off between bias and precision can be formalized in several ways, 
for example by specifying a loss or utility function that depends on how a user is af-
fected by deviations of the estimate of the ATE from the truth and then choosing an 
estimator or an experimental design that minimizes expected loss or maximizes ex-
pected utility. As Savage (1962, 34) noted, for a Bayesian, this involves allocating 
treatments and controls in “the specific layout that promised to tell him the most,” 
but without randomization. Of course, this requires serious and perhaps difficult 
thought about the mechanisms underlying the ATE, which randomization avoids. 
Savage also notes that several people with different priors may be involved in an in-
vestigation and that individual priors may be unreliable because of “vagueness and 
temptation to self-deception,” defects that randomization may alleviate, or at least 
evade. BCMS (2017) provide a proof of a Bayesian no-randomization theorem, and 
BCS (2016) provide an illustration of a school administrator who has long believed 
that school outcomes are determined, not by school quality, but by parental back-
ground, and who can learn the most by placing deprived children in (supposed) 
high-quality schools and privileged children in (supposed) low-quality schools, 
which is the kind of study setting to which case study methodology is well attuned. 
As BCS note, this allocation would not persuade those with different priors, and they 
propose randomization as a means of satisfying skeptical observers. As this example 
shows, it is not always necessary to encode prior information into a set of formal 
prior probabilities, though thought about what we are trying to learn is always re-
quired. 
Several points are important. First, the anti-randomization theorem is not a 
justification of any non-randomized design, for example, one that allows selection 
on unobservables, but only of the optimal design that is most informative. According 
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to Chalmers (2001) and Bothwell and Podolsky (2016), the development of random-
ization in medicine originated with Bradford-Hill, who used randomization in the 
first RCT in medicine—the streptomycin trial—because it prevented doctors select-
ing patients on the basis of perceived need (or against perceived need, leaning over 
backward as it were), an argument recently echoed by Worrall (2007). Randomiza-
tion serves this purpose, but so do other non-discretionary schemes; what is re-
quired is that hidden information should not be allowed to affect the allocation as 
would happen, for example, if subjects could choose their own assignments. 
Second, the ideal rules by which units are allocated to treatment or control 
depend on the covariates and on the investigators’ priors about how they affect the 
outcomes. This opens up all sorts of methods of inference that are long familiar but 
that are excluded by pure randomization. For example, what philosophers call the 
hypothetico-deductive method works by using theory to make a prediction that can 
be taken to the data for potential falsification (as in the school example above). This 
is the way that physicists learn, as do other researchers when they use theory to de-
rive predictions that can be tested against the data, perhaps in an RCT, but more fre-
quently not. As Lakatos 1970 (among others) has stressed, some of the most fruitful 
research advances are generated by the puzzles that result when the data fail to 
match such theoretical predictions. In economics, good examples include the equity 
premium puzzle, various purchasing power parity puzzles, the Feldstein-Horioka 
puzzle, the consumption smoothness puzzle, the puzzle of why in India, where mal-
nourishment is widespread, rapid income growth has been accompanied by s fall in 
calories consumed, and many others.  
Third, randomization, by ignoring prior information from theory and from 
covariates, is wasteful and even unethical when it unnecessarily exposes people, or 
unnecessarily many people, to possible harm in a risky experiment. Worrall (2008) 
documents the (extreme) case of ECMO (Extracorporeal Membrane Oxygenation), a 
new treatment for newborns with persistent pulmonary hypertension that was de-
veloped in the 1970s by intelligent and directed trial and error within a well-under-
stood theory of the disease and a good understanding of how the oxygenator should 
work. In early experimentation by the inventors, mortality was reduced from 80 to 
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20 percent. The investigators felt compelled to conduct an RCT, albeit with an adap-
tive ‘play-the-winner’ design in which each success in an arm increased the proba-
bility of the next baby being assigned to that arm. One baby received conventional 
therapy and died, 11 received ECMO and lived. Even so, a standard randomized con-
trolled trial was thought necessary. With a stopping rule of four deaths, four more 
babies (out of ten) died in the control group and none of the nine who received 
ECMO. 
Fourth, the non-random methods use prior information, which is why they 
do better than randomization. This is both an advantage and a disadvantage, de-
pending on one’s perspective. If prior information is not widely accepted, or is seen 
as non-credible by those we are seeking to persuade, we will generate more credible 
estimates if we do not use those priors. Indeed, this is why BCS (2017) recommend 
randomized designs, including in medicine and in development economics. They de-
velop a theory of an investigator who is facing an adversarial audience who will 
challenge any prior information and can even potentially veto results based on it 
(think of administrative agencies such as the FDA or journal referees). The experi-
menter trades off his or her own desire for precision (and preventing possible harm 
to subjects), which would require prior information, against the wishes of the audi-
ence, who wants nothing to do with those priors. Even then, the approval of the au-
dience is only ex ante; once the fully randomized experiment has been done, nothing 
stops critics arguing that, in fact, the randomization did not offer a fair test because 
important other causes were not balanced. Among doctors who use RCTs, and espe-
cially meta-analysis, such arguments are (appropriately) common (see Kramer 
(2016)). We return to this topic in Section 2.1. 
Today, when the public has come to question expert prior knowledge, RCTs 
will flourish. In cases where there is good reason to doubt the good faith of experi-
menters, randomization will indeed be an appropriate response. But we believe 
such a simplistic approach is destructive for scientific endeavor (which is not the 
purpose of the FDA) and should be resisted as a general prescription in scientific re-
search. Previous knowledge needs to be built on and incorporated into new 
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knowledge, not discarded. The systematic refusal to use prior knowledge and the as-
sociated preference for RCTs are recipes for preventing cumulative scientific pro-
gress. In the end, it is also self-defeating. To quote Rodrik (D. Rodrik, personal com-
munication, April 6, 2016) “the promise of RCTs as theory-free learning machines is 
a false one.”  
 
1.5 Statistical inference in RCTs 
The estimated ATE in a simple RCT is the difference in the means between the treat-
ment and control groups. When covariates are allowed for, as in most RCTs in eco-
nomics, the ATE is usually estimated from the coefficient on the treatment dummy 
in a regression that looks like (1), but with the heterogeneity in 𝛽 ignored. Modern 
work calculates standard errors allowing for the possibility that residual variances 
may be different in the treatment and control groups, usually by clustering the 
standard errors, which is equivalent to the familiar two sample standard error in 
the case with no covariates. Statistical inference is done with t-values in the usual 
way. Unfortunately, these procedures do not always give the right standard errors 
and, to reiterate, the value of randomization is that it permits inference about esti-
mates of ATEs, not that it guarantees the quality of these estimates, so credible 
standard errors are essential in any argument for RCTs. 
 Looking back at (1), the underlying objects of interest are the individual 
treatment effects 𝛽𝑖 for each of the individuals in the trial sample. Neither they, nor 
their distribution 𝐺(𝛽) is identified from an RCT; because RCTs make so few as-
sumptions which, in many cases, is their strength, they can identify only the mean of 
the distribution. In many observational studies, researchers are prepared to make 
more assumptions on functional forms or on distributions, and for that price we are 
able to identify other quantities of interest. Without these assumptions, inferences 
must be based on the difference in the two means, a statistic that is sometimes ill-
behaved, as we discuss below. This ill-behavior has nothing to do with RCTs, per se, 
but within RCTs, and their minimal assumptions, we cannot easily switch from the 
mean to some other quantity of interest. 
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 Fisher proposed that statistical inference should be done using what has be-
come known as ‘randomization inference’, a procedure that is as non-parametric as 
the RCT-based estimate of an ATE itself. To test the null hypothesis that 𝛽𝑖 = 0 for 
all i, note that, under the null that the treatment has no effect on any individual, an 
estimated nonzero ATE can only be a consequence of the particular random alloca-
tion that generated it (assuming no difference in the distributions of covariates post-
randomization). By tabulating all possible combinations of treatments and controls 
in our trial sample, and the ATE associated with each, we can calculate the exact dis-
tribution of the estimated ATE under the null. This allows us to calculate the proba-
bility of calculating an estimate as large as our actual estimate when the treatment 
has no effect. This randomization test requires a finite sample, but it will work for 
any sample size (see Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for an excellent account of the 
procedure).  
 Randomization inference can be used to test the null hypotheses that all of 
the treatment effects are zero, as in the above example, but it cannot be used to test 
the hypothesis that the average treatment effect is zero, which will often be of inter-
est. In agricultural trials, and in medicine, the stronger (sharp) hypothesis that the 
treatment has no effect whatever is often of interest. In many public health applica-
tions, we are content with improving average health, and in economic applications 
that involve money, such as welfare experiments or cost-benefit analyses, we are in-
terested in whether the net effect of the treatment is positive or negative, and in 
these cases, randomization inference cannot be used. None of which argues against 
its wider use in social sciences when appropriate. 
 In cases where randomization inference cannot be used, we must construct 
tests for the differences in two means. Standard procedures will often work well, but 
there are two potential pitfalls. One, the ‘Fisher-Behrens problem’, comes from the 
fact that, when the two samples have different variances—which we typically want 
to permit—the tstatistic as usually calculated does not have the t-distribution. The 
second problem, which is much harder to address, occurs when the distribution of 
treatment effects is not symmetric (Bahadur and Savage (1956)). Neither pitfall is 
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specific to RCTs, but RCTs force us to work with means in estimating treatment ef-
fects and, with only a few exceptions in the literature, social scientists who use RCTs 
appear to be unaware of the difficulties. 
 In the simple case of comparing two means in an RCT, inference is usually 
based on the two–sample t–statistic which is computed by dividing the ATE by the 
estimated standard error whose square is given by 
?̂?2 =
(𝑛1 − 1)
−1 ∑ (𝑌𝑖 − ?̅?1)𝑖𝜖1
2
𝑛1
+  
(𝑛0 − 1)
−1 ∑ (𝑌𝑖 − ?̅?0)𝑖𝜖0
2
𝑛0
(3) 
where 0 refers to controls and 1 to treatments, so that there are 𝑛1 treatments and 
𝑛0 controls, and ?̅?1 and ?̅?0 are the two means. As has long been known, the “tstatis-
tic’ based on (3) is not distributed as Student’s t if the two variances (treatment and 
control) are not identical but has the Behrens–Fisher distribution. In extreme cases, 
when one of the variances is zero, the t–statistic has effective degrees of freedom 
half of that of the nominal degrees of freedom, so that the test-statistic has thicker 
tails than allowed for, and there will be too many rejections when the null is true.  
Young (2017) argues that this problem is worse when the trial results are an-
alyzed by regressing outcomes not only on the treatment dummy but also on addi-
tional covariates and when using clustered or robust standard errors. When the de-
sign matrix is such that the maximal influence is large, which is likely if the distribu-
tion of the covariates is skewed so that for some observations outcomes have large 
influence on their own predicted values, there is a reduction in the effective degrees 
of freedom for the t–value(s) of the average treatment effect(s) leading to spurious 
findings of significance. Young looks at 2,027 regressions reported in 53 RCT papers 
in the American Economic Association journals and recalculates the significance of 
the estimates using randomization inference applied to the authors’ original data. In 
30 to 40 percent of the estimated treatment effects in individual equations with co-
efficients that are reported as significant, he cannot reject the null of no effect for 
any observation; the fraction of spuriously significant results increases further 
when he simultaneously tests for all results in each paper.  These spurious findings 
come in part from issues of multiple-hypothesis testing, both within regressions 
with several treatments and across regressions. Within regressions, treatments are 
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largely orthogonal, but authors tend to emphasize significant t–values even when 
the corresponding F-tests are insignificant. Across equations, results are often 
strongly correlated, so that, at worst, different regressions are reporting variants of 
the same result, thus spuriously adding to the ‘kill count’ of significant effects. At the 
same time, the pervasiveness of observations with high influence generates spuri-
ous significance on its own. 
These issues are now being taken more seriously, at least in economics. In 
addition to Young (2017), Imbens and Kolesár (2016) provide practical advice for 
dealing with the Fisher-Behrens problem, and the best current practice tries to be 
careful about multiple hypothesis testing. Yet it remains the case that many of the 
results reported in the literature are spuriously significant. 
Spurious significance also arises when the distribution of treatment effects 
contains outliers or, more generally, is not symmetric. Standard t–tests break down 
in distributions with enough skewness (see Lehmann and Romano (2005, 466–8)). 
How difficult is it to maintain symmetry? And how badly is inference affected when 
the distribution of treatment effects is not symmetric? One important example is ex-
penditures on healthcare. Most people have zero expenditure in any given period, 
but among those who do incur expenditures, a few individuals spend huge amounts 
that account for a large share of the total. Indeed, in the famous Rand health experi-
ment (see Manning, et al. (1987, 1988)), there is a single very large outlier. The au-
thors realize that the comparison of means across treatment arms is fragile, and, alt-
hough they do not see their problem exactly as described here, they obtain their 
preferred estimates using an approach that is explicitly designed to model the skew-
ness of expenditures.  Another example comes from economics, where many trials 
have outcomes valued in money. Does an anti-poverty innovation—for example mi-
crofinance—increase the incomes of the participants? Income itself is not symmetri-
cally distributed, and this might also be true of the treatment effects if there are a 
few people who are talented but credit-constrained entrepreneurs and who have 
treatment effects that are large and positive, while the vast majority of borrowers 
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fritter away their loans, or at best make positive but modest profits. A recent sum-
mary of the literature is consistent with this (see Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman 
(2015)).  
 In some cases, it will be appropriate to deal with outliers by trimming, trans-
forming, or eliminating observations that have large effects on the estimates. But if 
the experiment is a project evaluation designed to estimate the net benefits of a pol-
icy, the elimination of genuine outliers, as in the Rand Health Experiment, will viti-
ate the analysis. It is precisely the outliers that make or break the program. Trans-
formations, such as taking logarithms, may help to produce symmetry, but they 
change the nature of the question being asked; a cost benefit analysis or healthcare 
reform costing must be done in dollars, not log dollars. 
 We consider an example that illustrates what can happen in a realistic but 
simplified case; the full results are reported in the Appendix. We imagine a popula-
tion of individuals, each with a treatment effect 𝛽𝑖. The parent population mean of 
the treatment effects is zero, but there is a long tail of positive values; we use a left-
shifted lognormal distribution. This could be a healthcare expenditure trial or a mi-
crofinance trial, where there is a long positive tail of rare individuals who incur very 
high costs or who can do amazing things with credit while most people cost nothing 
in the period studied or cannot use the credit effectively. A trial sample of 2n  indi-
viduals is randomly drawn from the parent population and is randomly split be-
tween n treatments and n controls. Within each trial sample, whose true ATE will 
generally differ from zero because of the sampling, we run many RCTs and tabulate 
the values of the ATE for each.  
Using standard ttests, the (true in the parent distribution) hypothesis that 
the ATE is zero is rejected between 14 (𝑛 = 25) and 6 percent (𝑛 = 500) of the time. 
These rejections come from two separate issues, both of which are relevant in prac-
tice: (a) that the ATE in the trial sample differs from the ATE in the parent popula-
tion of interest, and (b) that the tvalues are not distributed as t in the presence of 
outliers. The problem cases are when the trial sample happens to contain one or 
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more outliers, something that is always a risk given the long positive tail of the par-
ent distribution. When this happens, everything depends on whether the outlier is 
among the treatments or the controls; in effect, the outliers become the sample, re-
ducing the effective number of degrees of freedom. In extreme cases, one of which is 
illustrated in Figure A.1, the distribution of estimated ATEs is bimodal, depending 
on the group to which the outlier is assigned. When the outlier is in the treatment 
group, the dispersion across outcomes is large, as is the estimated standard error, 
and so those outcomes rarely reject the null using the standard table of t–values. 
The over-rejections come from cases when the outlier is in the control group, the 
outcomes are not so dispersed, and the t–values can be large, negative, and signifi-
cant. While these cases of bimodal distributions may not be common and depend on 
the existence of large outliers, they illustrate the process that generates the over-re-
jections and spurious significance. Note that there is no remedy through randomiza-
tion inference here, given that our interest is in the hypothesis that the average 
treatment effect is zero. 
 Our reading of the literature on RCTs in social and public health policy areas 
suggests that they are not exempt from these concerns. Many trials are run on 
(sometimes very) small samples, they have treatment effects where asymmetry is 
hard to rule out—especially when the outcomes are in money—and they often give 
results that are puzzling, or at least not easily interpreted theoretically. In the con-
text of development studies, neither Banerjee and Duflo (2012) nor Karlan and Ap-
pel (2011), who cite many RCTs, raise concerns about misleading inference, implic-
itly treating all results as reliable. Some of these results contradict standard theory. 
No doubt there are behaviors in the world that are inconsistent with conventional 
economics, and some can be explained by standard biases in behavioral economics, 
but it would also be good to be suspicious of the significance tests before accepting 
that an unexpected finding is well-supported and that theory must be revised. Repli-
cation of results in different settings may be helpful, if they are the right kind of 
places (see our discussion in Section 2). Yet it hardly solves the problem given that 
the asymmetry may be in the same direction in different settings, that it seems likely 
to be so in just those settings that are sufficiently like the original trial setting to be 
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of use for inference about the population of interest, and that the ‘significant’ t–val-
ues will show departures from the null in the same direction. This, then, replicates 
the spurious findings.  
 
1.6 Familiar threats to unbiasedness 
It is of great importance to note that randomization, by itself, is not sufficient to 
guarantee unbiasedness if post-randomization differences are permitted to affect 
the two groups. This requires ‘policing’ of the experiment, for example by requiring 
that subjects, experimenters, and analysts are blinded and that differences in treat-
ments or outcomes do not reveal their status to subjects. Familiar concerns about 
selection bias and the placebo, Pygmalion, Hawthorne, John Henry, and 
'teacher/therapist' effects are widespread across studies of medical and social inter-
ventions.  The difficulty of controlling for placebo effects can be especially acute in 
testing medical interventions (see Howick (2011), Chapter 7 for a critical review), as 
is the difficulty in controlling both for placebo effects and the effects of therapist 
variables in testing psychological therapies. For instance, Pitman,  et al. (2017) sug-
gest how difficult it will be to identify just what a psychological therapy consists of; 
Kramer and Stiles (2015) treat the ‘responsiveness’ problem of categorizing thera-
pist responses to emerging context; and there has been a lively debate about 
whether cognitive mechanisms of change are responsible for the effectiveness of 
cognitive therapy for depression based on data that shows the changes in symptoms 
occur mainly before the cognitive techniques are brought into play (Ilardi and 
Craighead (1999), Vittengl et al. (2014)).  
Many social and economic trials, medical trials, and public health trials are 
not blinded nor sufficiently controlled for other sources of bias, and indeed many 
cannot be, and a sufficient defense is rarely offered that unbiasedness is not under-
mined. Generally, it is recommended to extend blinding beyond participants and in-
vestigators to include those who measure outcomes and those who analyze the data, 
all of whom may be affected by both conscious and unconscious bias. The need for 
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blinding in those who assess outcomes is particularly important in cases where out-
comes are not determined by strictly prescribed procedures whose application is 
transparent and checkable but requires elements of judgment. 
Beyond the need to control for ‘psychological’ or ‘placebo’ effects, blinding of 
trial participants is important in cases where there is no compulsion, so that people 
who are randomized into the treatment group are free to choose to refuse treat-
ment. In many cases it is reasonable to suppose that people choose to participate if 
it is in their interest to do so. In consequence, those who estimate (consciously or 
unconsciously) that their gain is not high enough to offset the perceived drawbacks 
of compliance with the treatment protocol may avoid it. The selective acceptance of 
treatment limits the analyst’s ability to learn about people who decline treatment 
but who would have to accept it if the policy were implemented. In these cases, both 
the intention-to-treat estimator and the ‘as treated’ estimator that compares the 
treated and the untreated are affected by the kind of selection effects that randomi-
zation is designed to eliminate.  
So, blinding matters for unbiasedness and is very often missing (see also Her-
nán et al. (2013)). This is not to say that one should assume without argument that 
non-blinding at any point will introduce bias. That is a matter to be assessed case-
by-case. But the contrary cannot be automatically assumed. This brings to the fore 
the trade-off between using an RCT-based estimate that may well be biased, and in 
ways we do not have good ideas how to deal with, versus one from an observational 
study where blinding may have been easier, or some of these sources of bias may be 
missing or where we may have a better understanding of how to correct for them. 
For instance, blinding is sometimes automatic in observational studies, e.g. from ad-
ministrative records. (See for example Horwitz et al. 2017 for a discussion of the 
complications of analyzing the result in the large Women’s Health Trial when it was 
noted that due to the presence of side effects of the treatment “blinding was broken 
for nearly half of the HRT users but only a small percentage of the placebo users” 
[1248].) 
Lack of blinding is not the only source of post-randomization bias. Subse-
quent treatment decisions can differ, and treatments and controls may be handled 
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in different places, or by differently trained practitioners, or at different times of 
day, and these differences can bring with them systematic differences in the other 
causes to which the two groups are exposed. These can, and should, be guarded 
against. But doing so requires an understanding of what these causally relevant fac-
tors might be. 
 
1.7 A summary 
What do the arguments of this section mean about the importance of randomization 
and the interpretation that should be given to an estimated ATE from a randomized 
trial?  
First, we should be sure that an unbiased estimate of an ATE for the trial pop-
ulation is likely to be useful enough to warrant the costs of running the trial.  
Second, since randomization does not ensure orthogonality, to conclude that 
an estimate is unbiased, warrant is required that there are no significant post-ran-
domization correlates with the treatment.  
Third, the inference problems reviewed here cannot just be presumed away. 
When there is substantial heterogeneity, the ATE in the trial sample can be quite dif-
ferent from the ATE in the population of interest, even if the trial is randomly se-
lected from that population; in practice, the relationship between the trial sample 
and the population is often obscure (see Longford and Nelder (1999)). 
Fourth, beyond that, in many case the statistical inference will be fine, but se-
rious attention should be given to the possibility that there are outliers in treatment 
effects, something that knowledge of the problem can suggest and where inspection 
of the marginal distributions of treatments and controls may be informative. For ex-
ample, if both are symmetric, it seems unlikely (though certainly not impossible) 
that the treatment effects are highly skewed. Measures to deal with Fisher-Behrens 
should be used and randomization inference considered when appropriate to the 
hypothesis of interest.  
All of this can be regarded as recommendations for improvement to current 
practice, not a challenge to it. More fundamentally, we strongly contest the often-ex-
 30 
pressed idea that the ATE calculated from an RCT is automatically reliable, that ran-
domization automatically controls for unobservables, or worst of all, that the calcu-
lated ATE is true. If, by chance, it is close to the truth, the truth we are referring to is 
the truth in the trial sample only. To make any inference beyond that requires argu-
ments of the kind we consider in the next section. We have also argued that, depend-
ing on what we are trying to measure and what we want to use that measure for, 
there is no presumption that an RCT is the best means of estimating it. That too re-
quires an argument, not a presumption. 
 
Section 2: Using the results of randomized controlled trials 
2.1 Introduction 
Suppose we have estimated an ATE from a well-conducted RCT on a trial sample, 
and our standard error gives us reason to believe that the effect did not come about 
by chance. We thus have good warrant that the treatment causes the effect in our 
trial sample, up to the limits of statistical inference. What are such findings good for?  
The literature discussing RCTs has paid more attention to obtaining results than to 
considering what can justifiably be done with them. There is insufficient theoretical 
and empirical work to guide us how and for what purposes to use the findings. What 
there is tends to focus on the conditions under which the same results hold outside 
of the original settings or how they might be adapted for use elsewhere, with almost 
no attention to how they might be used for formulating, testing, understanding, or 
probing hypotheses beyond the immediate relation between the treatment and the 
outcome investigated in the study. Yet it cannot be that knowing how to use results 
is less important than knowing how to demonstrate them. Any chain of evidence is 
only as strong as it weakest link, so that a rigorously established effect whose ap-
plicability is justified by a loose declaration of simile warrants little. If trials are to 
be useful, we need paths to their use that are as carefully constructed as are the tri-
als themselves.  
The argument for the ‘primacy of internal validity’ made by Shadish, Cook, 
and Campbell (2002) may be reasonable as a warning that bad RCTs are unlikely to 
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generalize, although as Cook (2014) notes “inferences about internal validity are in-
evitability probabilistic.” Moreover, the primacy statement is sometimes incorrectly 
taken to imply that results of an internally valid trial will automatically, or often, ap-
ply ‘as is’ elsewhere, or that this should be the default assumption failing arguments 
to the contrary, as if a parameter, once well established, can be expected to be invar-
iant across settings. The invariance assumption is often made in medicine, for exam-
ple, where it is sometimes plausible that a particular procedure or drug works the 
same way everywhere, though its effects cannot be the same at all stages of the dis-
ease. More generally, Horton (2000) gives a strong dissent and Rothwell (2005) pro-
vides arguments on both sides of the question. We should also note the recent 
movement to ensure that testing of drugs includes women and minorities because 
members of those groups suppose that the results of trials on mostly healthy young 
white males do not apply to them, as well as the increasing call for pragmatic trials, 
as in Williams et al. (2015): “[P]ragmatic trials …  ask ‘we now know it can work, but 
how well does it work in real world clinical practice?’”   
Our approach to the use of RCT results is based on the observation that 
whether, and in what ways, an RCT result is evidence depends on exactly what the 
hypothesis is for which the result is supposed to be evidence, and that what kinds of 
hypotheses these will be depends on the purposes to be served.  This should in turn 
affect the design of the trial itself. This is recognized in the medical literature in the 
distinction between explanatory and pragmatic trials and the proposals to adapt 
trial design to the question asked, as for example in Patsopoulos (2011, 218): “The 
explanatory trial is the best design to explore if and how an intervention works” 
whereas “The research question under investigation is whether an intervention actu-
ally works in real life.” It is also reflected in, for example, Rothman et l. (2013, 1013), 
whom we echo in arguing that simple extrapolation is not the sole purpose to which 
RCT results can be put: “The mistake is to think that statistical inference is the same 
as scientific inference.”  We shall distinguish a number of different purposes and dis-
cuss how, and when, RCTs can serve them: (a) simple extrapolation and simple gen-
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eralization, (b) drawing lessons about the population enrolled in the trial, (c) ex-
trapolation with adjustment, (d) estimating what happens if we scale up, (e) predict-
ing the results of treatment on the individual, and (f) building and testing theory.  
 This list is hardly exhaustive. We noted in Section 1.4 one further use that we 
do not pursue here: The widespread and largely uncritical belief that RCTs give the 
right answer permits them to be used as dispute-reconciliation mechanisms to re-
solve political conflicts. For example, at the Federal level in the US, prospective poli-
cies are vetted by the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which makes 
its own estimates of budgetary implications. Ideologues whose programs are scored 
poorly by the CBO have an incentive to support an RCT, not to convince themselves, 
but to convince opponents. Once again, RCTs are valuable when your opponents do 
not share your prior.  
 
2.2 Simple extrapolation and simple generalization 
Suppose a trial has (probabilistically) established a result in a specific setting.  If `the 
same’ result holds elsewhere, it is said to have external validity. External validity 
may refer just to the replication of the causal connection or go further and require 
replication of the magnitude of the ATE. Either way, the result holds—everywhere, 
or widely, or in some specific elsewhere—or it does not.  
This binary concept of external validity is often unhelpful because it asks the 
results of an RCT to satisfy a condition that is neither necessary nor sufficient for tri-
als to be useful, and so both overstates and understates their value. It directs us to-
ward simple extrapolation—whether the same result holds elsewhere—or simple 
generalization—it holds universally or at least widely—and away from more com-
plex but equally useful applications of the results. The failure of external validity in-
terpreted as simple generalization or extrapolation says little about the value of the 
results of the trial.  
There are several uses of RCTs that do not require applying their results be-
yond the original context; we discuss these in Section 2.4. Beyond that, there are of-
ten good reasons to expect that the results from a well-conducted, informative, and 
potentially useful RCT will not apply elsewhere in any simple way. Without further 
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understanding and analysis, even successful replication tells us little either for or 
against simple generalization nor does much to support the conclusion that the next 
will work in the same way. Nor do failures of replication make the original result 
useless. We often learn much from coming to understand why replication failed and 
can use that knowledge in looking for how the factors that caused the original result 
might operate differently in different settings. Third, and particularly important for 
scientific progress, the RCT result can be incorporated into a network of evidence 
and hypotheses that test or explore claims that look very different from the results 
reported from the RCT. We shall give examples below of valuable uses for RCTs that 
are not externally valid in the (usual) sense that their results do not hold elsewhere, 
whether in a specific target setting or in the more sweeping sense of holding every-
where, or everywhere in some specified domain.  
The RAND health experiment (Manning et al. (1987, 88)) provides an instruc-
tive story if only because its results have permeated the academic and policy discus-
sions about healthcare ever since. It was originally designed to test whether more 
generous insurance causes people to use more medical care and, if so, by how much. 
The incentive effects are hardly in doubt today; the immortality of the study comes 
rather from the fact that its multi-arm (response surface) design allowed the calcu-
lation of an elasticity for the study population, that medical expenditures decreased 
by –0.1 to –0.2 percent for every percentage increase in the copayment. According 
to Aron-Dine et al. (2013), it is this dimensionless and thus apparently exportable 
number that has been used ever since to discuss the design of healthcare policy; the 
elasticity has come to be treated as a universal constant. Ironically, they argue that 
the estimate cannot be replicated in recent studies, and that it is unclear that it is 
firmly based on the original evidence. The simple direct exportability of the result 
was perhaps illusory.   
The drive to export and generalize RCTs results is at the core of the influen-
tial ‘what works’ movement across the medical and social sciences. At its most ambi-
tious, this aims for universal reach. For example, in the development economics lit-
erature, Duflo and Kremer (2008, 93) argue that “credible impact evaluations are 
global public goods in the sense that they can offer reliable guidance to international 
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organizations, governments, donors, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
beyond national borders.” Sometimes the results of a single RCT are advocated as 
having wide applicability, with especially strong endorsement when there is at least 
one replication.  
Simple extrapolation is often used to move RCT results from one setting to 
another. Much of what is written in the ‘what works’ literature suggests that, unless 
there is evidence to the contrary, the direction and size of treatment effects can be 
transported from one place to another without serious adjustment. The Abdul Latif 
Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) conducts RCTs around the world and summarizes 
findings in an attempt to reduce poverty by the use of “scientific evidence to inform 
policy.” Some of their reports convert results into a common cost-effectiveness 
measure. For example, Improving Student Participation--Which programs most effec-
tively get children into school? classifies results into six categories: school time 
travel, subsidies and transfers, health, perceived returns, education quality, and gen-
der specific barriers; results are reported in the common unit, “additional years of 
education for US$100 spent.”  “Health”, which top-rated by far, includes two studies, 
“deworming” in Kenya (11.91) and “iron & vitamin A” in India (2.61); “perceived re-
turns” to education has one study in the Dominican Republic (0.23); “subsidies and 
transfers” includes the most studies—six, with results ranging from 0.17 for “sec-
ondary scholarships” in Ghana to 0.01, for “CCT” (Conditional Cash Transfers) in 
Mexico and 0.09 and 0.07 for “CCT” in Malawi. 
What can we conclude from such comparisons? A philanthropic donor inter-
ested in education, who assumes that marginal and average effects are the same, 
might learn that the best place to devote a marginal dollar is in Kenya, where it 
would be used for deworming. This is certainly useful, but it is not as useful as state-
ments that deworming programs are everywhere more cost-effective than programs 
involving vitamin A or scholarships, or if not everywhere, at least over some do-
main, and it is these second kinds of comparison that would genuinely fulfill the 
promise of ‘finding out what works.’  But such comparisons only make sense if the 
results from one place can be relied on to apply in another, if the Kenyan results also 
hold in the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Ghana, or in some specific list of places.  
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What does J-PAL conclude? Here are two of their reported “Practical Implica-
tions”: “Conditional and unconditional cash transfers can increase school enrolment 
and attendance, but are expensive to implement...Eliminating small costs can have 
substantial impacts on school participation.” ‘Can’ here is admittedly an ambiguous 
word. It is certainly true in a logical sense that if a program has achieved a given re-
sult, then it can do so. But we suspect that the more natural sense for readers to take 
away is that the program ‘may well’ do so most other places, in the absence of spe-
cial problems, or that that is at least the default assumption. 
Trials, as is widely noted, often take place in artificial environments which 
raises well recognized problems for extrapolation. For instance, with respect to eco-
nomic development, Drèze (J. Drèze, personal communications, November 8, 2017) 
notes, based on extensive experience in India, that “when a foreign agency comes in 
with its heavy boots and deep pockets to administer a ‘treatment,’ whether through 
a local NGO or government or whatever, there tends to be a lot going on other than 
the treatment.” There is also the suspicion that a treatment that works does so be-
cause of the presence of the ‘treators,’ often from abroad, and may not do so with 
the people who will work it in practice.  
J-PAL’s manual for cost-effectiveness (Dhaliwal et al. (2012)) explains in (en-
tirely appropriate) detail how to handle variation in costs across sites, noting varia-
ble factors such as population density, prices, exchange rates, discount rates, infla-
tion, and bulk discounts. But it gives short shrift to cross-site variation in the size of 
ATEs, which also play a key part in the calculations of cost effectiveness. The manual 
briefly notes that diminishing returns (or the last-mile problem) might be important 
in theory but argues that the baseline levels of outcomes are likely to be similar in 
the pilot and replication areas, so that the ATE can be safely assumed to apply as is. 
All of this lacks a justification for extrapolating results, some understanding of when 
results can be extrapolated, when they cannot, or better still, how they should be 
modified to make them applicable in a new setting.  Without well substantiated as-
sumptions to support the projection of results, this is just induction by simple enu-
meration—swan 1 is white, swan 2 is white, . . . , so all swans are white; and, as 
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Francis Bacon (1859, 1.105) taught, “…the induction that proceeds by simple enu-
merations is childish.”  
Bertrand Russell’s chicken (Russell (1912)) provides an excellent example of 
the limitations to simple extrapolation from repeated successful replication. The 
bird infers, on repeated evidence, that when the farmer comes in the morning, he 
feeds her. The inference serves her well until Christmas morning, when he wrings 
her neck and serves her for dinner. Though this chicken did not base her inference 
on an RCT, had we constructed one for her, we would have obtained the same result 
that she did. Her problem was not her methodology, but rather that she did not un-
derstand the social and economic structure that gave rise to the causal relations that 
she observed. (We shall return to the importance of the underlying structure for un-
derstanding what causal pathways are likely and what are unlikely below.) 
The problems with simple extrapolation and simple generalization extend 
beyond RCTs, to both ‘fully controlled’ laboratory experiments and to most non-ex-
perimental findings. Our argument here is that evidence from RCTs is not automati-
cally simply generalizable, and that its superior internal validity, if and when it ex-
ists, does not provide it with any unique invariance across context. That simple ex-
trapolation and simple generalization are far from automatic also tells us why (even 
ideal) RCTs of similar interventions give different answers in different settings and 
the results of large RCTs may differ from the results of meta-analyses on the same 
treatment (as in LeLorier et al. (1997)). Such differences do not necessarily reflect 
methodological failings and will hold across perfectly executed RCTs just as they do 
across observational studies.  
Our arguments are not meant to suggest that extrapolation or even generali-
zation is never reasonable. For instance, conditional cash transfers have worked for 
a variety of different outcomes in different places; they are often cited as a leading 
example of how an evaluation with strong internal validity leads to a rapid spread of 
the policy. Think through the causal chain that is required for CCTs to be successful: 
People must like money, they must like (or do not object too much) to their children 
being educated and vaccinated, there must exist schools and clinics that are close 
enough and well enough staffed to do their job, and the government or agency that 
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is running the scheme must care about the wellbeing of families and their children. 
That such conditions hold in a wide range of (although certainly not all) countries 
makes it unsurprising that CCTs ‘work’ in many replications, though they certainly 
will not work in places where the schools and clinics do not exist, e.g. Levy (2006), 
nor in places where people strongly oppose education or vaccination. So, there are 
structural reasons why CCT results export where they do. Our objection is to the as-
sumption that it is ‘natural’ that well-established results export; to the contrary, 
good reasons are needed to justify that they do.  
To summarize. Establishing causality does nothing in and of itself to guaran-
tee that the causal relation will hold in some new case, let alone in general. Nor does 
the ability of an ideal RCT to eliminate bias from selection or from omitted variables 
mean that the resulting ATE from the trial sample will apply anywhere else.  The is-
sue is worth mentioning only because of the enormous weight that is currently at-
tached to policing the rigor with which causal claims are established by contrast 
with the rigor devoted to all those further claims—often unstated even—that go 
into warranting extrapolating or generalizing the relations. 
 
2.3 Support factors and the ATE  
The operation of a cause generally requires the presence of support factors (also 
known as ‘interactive variables’ or ‘moderators’), factors without which a cause that 
produces the targeted effect in one place, even though it may be present and have 
the capacity to operate elsewhere, will remain latent and inoperative. What Mackie 
(1974) called INUS causality (Insufficient but Non-redundant parts of a condition 
that is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for a contribution to the outcome) is the kind 
of causality reflected in equation (1). (See Rothman (1976, 2012) for the same idea 
in epidemiology, which uses the term ‘causal pie’ to refer to a set of causes that are 
jointly but not separately sufficient for a contribution to an effect.) A standard exam-
ple is a house burning down because the television was left on, although televisions 
do not operate in this way without support factors, such as wiring faults, the pres-
ence of tinder, and so on.  
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The value of the ATE depends on the distribution of the values of the ‘support 
factors’ necessary for T to contribute to Y. This becomes clear if we rewrite (1) in 
the form 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖𝑇𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 𝜃(𝑤𝑖)𝑇𝑖
𝐽
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
(4) 
where the function 𝜃(. ) controls how a k-vector 𝑤𝑖 of k ‘support factors’ affect indi-
vidual i’s treatment effect 𝛽𝑖. The support factors may include some of the x’s. Since 
the ATE is the average of the 𝛽𝑖𝑠, two populations will have the same ATE if and only 
if they have the same average for the net effect of the support factors necessary for 
the treatment to work, i.e. for the quantity in front of 𝑇𝑖. These are however just the 
kind of factors that are likely to be differently distributed in different populations.,  
Given that support factors will operate with different strengths and effective-
ness in different places, it is not surprising that the size of the ATE differs from place 
to place; for example, Vivalt’s AidGrade website lists 29 estimates from a range of 
countries of the standardized (divided by local standard deviation of the outcome) 
effects of CCTs on school attendance; all but four show the expected positive effect, 
and the range runs from –8 to +38 percentage points (Vivalt (2016)). Even in this 
leading case, where we might reasonably conclude that CCTs ‘work’ in getting chil-
dren into school, it would be hard to calculate credible cost-effectiveness numbers 
or to come to a general conclusion about whether CCTs are more or less cost effec-
tive than other possible policies. Both costs and effect sizes can be expected to differ 
in new settings, just as they have in observed ones, making these predictions diffi-
cult.  
 AidGrade uses standardized measures of effect size divided by standard devi-
ation of outcome at baseline, as does the major multi-country study by Banerjee et 
al. (2015). But we might prefer measures that have an economic interpretation, such 
as J-PAL’s ‘additional months of schooling per US$100 spent’ (for example if a donor 
is trying to decide where to spend, as we noted). Nutrition might be measured by 
height, or by the log of height. Even if the ATE by one measure carries across, it will 
only do so using another measure if the relationship between the two measures is 
 39 
the same in both situations. This is exactly the sort of thing that a formal analysis of 
what reasons justify simple extrapolation and how to adjust predictions when sim-
ple extrapolation is not justified forces us to think about.  (Note also that the ATE in 
the original RCT can differ depending on whether the outcome is measured in levels 
or in logs; it is easy to construct examples where the two ATEs have different signs.) 
The worry is not just that the distribution of values for the support factors in 
a new setting will differ from the distribution in the trial but that what those sup-
port factors are will differ, or indeed whether there are any at all in the new setting 
that can get the treatment to work there. Causal processes often require highly spe-
cialized economic, cultural, or social structures to enable them to work. Different 
structures will enable different processes with different causes and different sup-
port factors. Consider the Rube Goldberg machine that is rigged up so that flying a 
kite sharpens a pencil (Cartwright and Hardie (2012, 77)). The underlying structure 
affords a very specific form of (4) that will not describe causal processes elsewhere.  
The Rube Goldberg machine is an exaggerated example, but it makes transparent 
how unreliable simple extrapolation is likely to be when little knowledge of causal 
structure is available. 
For more typical examples, consider systems design, where we aim to con-
struct systems that will generate causal relations that we like and that will rule out 
causal relations that we do not like. Healthcare systems are designed to prevent 
nurses and doctors making errors; cars are designed so that drivers cannot start 
them in reverse; work schedules for pilots are designed so they do not fly too many 
consecutive hours without rest because alertness and performance are compro-
mised. In philosophy, a system of interacting parts that underpins causal processes 
and makes some possible and some impossible, some likely and some unlikely is la-
belled a mechanism. (Note that this is only one of many meanings in philosophy and 
elsewhere for the term ‘mechanism’; in particular it is not ‘mechanism’ in the sense 
of the causal pathway from treatment to outcomes, which is another common use, 
for example in Suzuki et al. (2011)). Mechanisms are particularly important in un-
derstanding the explanation of causal processes in biology and the philosophical lit-
erature is rife with biological examples, as in the account in the seminal Machamer 
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et al. (2000) of how Shepherd (1988) uses biochemical mechanisms at chemical syn-
apses to explain the process of transmitting electrical signals from one neuron to an-
other. (See also Bechtel (2006), Craver (2007).) ‘Mechanism’ in this sense is nor re-
stricted to physical parts and their interactions and constraints but includes social, 
cultural, and economic arrangements, institutions, norms, habits, and individual 
psychology. (See, for example, Seckinelgin (2016) on the importance of context in 
determining the effectiveness of HIV-AIDs therapies.) 
As in the Rube Goldberg machine and in the design of cars and work sched-
ules, the physical, social, and economic structure and equilibrium may differ in ways 
that support, permit, or block different kinds of causal relations and thus render a 
trial in one setting useless in another. For example, a trial that relies on providing 
incentives for personal promotion is of no use in a state in which a political system 
locks people into their social and economic positions. Cash transfers that are condi-
tional on parents taking their children to clinics cannot improve child health in the 
absence of functioning clinics. Policies targeted at men may not work for women. 
We use a lever to toast our bread, but levers only operate to toast bread in a toaster; 
we cannot brown toast by pressing an accelerator, even if the principle of the lever 
is the same in both a toaster and a car. If we misunderstand the setting, if we do not 
understand why the treatment in our RCT works, we run the same risks as Russell’s 
chicken. (See Little (2007) and Howick et al. (2013) for many of the difficulties in us-
ing claims about mechanistic structure to support extrapolation, and Parkkinen et 
al. (2018) defending the importance of mechanistic reasoning both for internal va-
lidity and for extrapolation.) 
 
2.4 When RCTs speak for themselves: no extrapolation or generalization required 
For some things we want to learn, an RCT is enough by itself. An RCT may provide a 
counterexample to a general theoretical proposition, either to the proposition itself 
(a simple refutation test) or to some consequence of it (a complex refutation test). 
An RCT may also confirm a prediction of a theory, and although this does not con-
firm the theory, it is evidence in its favor, especially if the prediction seems inher-
ently unlikely in advance. This is all familiar territory, and there is nothing unique 
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about an RCT; it is simply one among many possible testing procedures. Even when 
there is no theory, or very weak theory, an RCT, by demonstrating causality in some 
population can be thought of as proof of concept, that the treatment is capable of 
working somewhere (as in the remark from Curtis Meinert, prominent expert on 
clinical trial methodology: “There is no point in worrying whether a treatment 
works the same or differently in men and women until it has been shown to work in 
someone” (quoted in Epstein (2007, 108))). This is one of the arguments for the im-
portance of internal validity.  
Nor is extrapolation called for when an RCT is used for evaluation, for exam-
ple to satisfy donors that the project they funded achieved its aims in the population 
in which it was conducted. Even so, for such evaluations, say by the World Bank, to 
be useful to the world at large (to be global public goods) requires arguments and 
guidelines that justify using the results in some way elsewhere; the global public 
good is not an automatic by-product of the Bank fulfilling its fiduciary responsibility.  
We need something, some regularity or invariance, and that something can rarely be 
recovered by simply generalizing across trials.  
 A third non-problematic and important use of an RCT is when the parameter 
of interest is the ATE in a well-defined population from which the trial sample is it-
self a random sample. In this case the sample average treatment effect (SATE) is an 
unbiased estimator of the population average treatment effect (PATE) that, by as-
sumption, is our target (see Imbens (2004) for these terms). We refer to this as the 
‘public health’ case; like many public health interventions, the target is the average, 
‘population health,’ not the health of individuals.  One major (and widely recog-
nized) danger of this use of RCTs is that exporting results from (even a random) 
sample to the population will not go through in any simple way if the outcomes of 
individuals or groups of individuals change the behavior of others—which is com-
mon in social examples and in public health whenever there is a possibility of conta-
gion.  
 
2.5 Reweighting and stratifying 
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Many advocates of RCTs understand that ‘what works’ needs to be qualified to `what 
works under which circumstances’ and try to say something about what those cir-
cumstances might be, for example, by replicating RCTs in different places and think-
ing intelligently about the differences in outcomes when they find them. Sometimes 
this is done in a systematic way, for example by having multiple treatments within 
the same trial so that it is possible to estimate a ‘response surface’ that links out-
comes to various combinations of treatments (see Greenberg and Schroder (2004) 
or Shadish et al. (2002)). For example, the RAND health experiment had multiple 
treatments, allowing investigation of how much health insurance increased expendi-
tures under different circumstances. Some of the negative income tax experiments 
(NITs) in the 1960s and 1970s were designed to estimate response surfaces, with 
the number of treatments and controls in each arm optimized to maximize precision 
of estimated response functions subject to an overall cost limit (see Conlisk (1973)). 
Experiments on time-of-day pricing for electricity had a similar structure (see 
Aigner (1985)). 
The experiments by MDRC have also been analyzed across cities in an effort 
to link city features to the results of the RCTs within them (see Bloom et al. (2005)). 
Unlike the RAND and NIT examples, these are ex post analyses of completed trials; 
the same is true of Vivalt (2015), who finds, for the collection of trials she studied, 
that development-related RCTs run by government agencies typically find smaller 
(standardized) effect sizes than RCTs run by academics or by NGOs. Bold et al. 
(2013), who ran parallel RCTs on an intervention implemented either by an NGO or 
by the government of Kenya, found similar results there. Note that these analyses 
have a different purpose from meta-analyses that assume that different trials esti-
mate the same parameter up to noise and average in order to increase precision. 
Statistical approaches are also widely used to adjust the results from a trial 
population to predict those in a target population; these are designed to deal with 
the fact that treatment effects vary systematically with variations in the support fac-
tors. One procedure to deal with this is post-experimental stratification, which paral-
lels post-survey stratification in sample surveys. The trial is broken up into sub-
groups that have the same combination of known, observable w’s (age, race, gender, 
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co-morbidities for example), then the ATEs within each of the subgroups are calcu-
lated, and then they are reassembled according to the configuration of w’s in the 
new context. This can be used to estimate the ATE in a new context, or to correct es-
timates to the parent population when the trial sample is not a random sample of 
the parent. Other methods can be used when there are too many w’s for stratifica-
tion, for example by estimating the probability of each observation in the population 
included in the trial sample as a function of the w’s, then weighting each observation 
by the inverse of these propensity scores. A good reference for these methods is Stu-
art et al. (2011), or in economics, Angrist (2004) and Hotz et al. (2005).) 
These methods are often not applicable, however. First, reweighting works 
only when the observable factors used for reweighting include all (and only) genu-
ine interactive causes (support/moderator factors). Second, as with any form of re-
weighting, the variables used to construct the weights must be present in both the 
original and new context. For example, if we are to carry a result forward in time, we 
may not be able to extrapolate from a period of low inflation to a period of high in-
flation; medical treatments that work in cold climates may not work in the tropics. 
As Hotz et al. (2005) note, it will typically be necessary to rule out such ‘macro’ ef-
fects, whether over time, or over locations. Third, reweighting also depends on the 
assumption that the same governing equation (4) covers both the trial and the tar-
get population.  
Pearl and Bareinboim (2011, 2014) and Bareinboim and Pearl (2013, 2014) 
provide strategies for inferring information about new populations from trial re-
sults that are more general than reweighting. They suppose we have available both 
causal information and probabilistic information for population A (e.g. the experi-
mental one), while for population B (the target) we have only (some) probabilistic 
information, and also that we know that certain probabilistic and causal facts are 
shared between the two and certain ones are not. They offer theorems describing 
what causal conclusions about population B are thereby fixed. Their work under-
lines the fact that exactly what conclusions about one population can be supported 
by information about another depends on exactly what causal and probabilistic facts 
they have in common. But as Muller (2015) notes, this, like the problem with simple 
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reweighting, takes us back to the situation that RCTs are designed to avoid, where 
we need to start from a complete and correct specification of the causal structure. 
RCTs can avoid this in estimation—which is one of their strengths, supporting their 
credibility—but the benefit vanishes as soon as we try to carry their results to a new 
context.  
This discussion leads to a number of points. First it underlines our previous 
arguments that we cannot get to general claims by simple generalization; there is no 
warrant for the convenient assumption that the ATE estimated in a specific RCT is 
an invariant parameter, nor that the kinds of interventions and outcomes we meas-
ure in typical RCTs participate in general causal relations.  
Second, thoughtful pre-experimental stratification in RCTs is likely to be val-
uable, or failing that, subgroup analysis, because it can provide information that may 
be useful for generalization or extrapolation. For example, Kremer and Holla (2009) 
note that, in their trials, school attendance is surprisingly sensitive to small subsi-
dies, which they suggest is because there are a large number of students and parents 
who are on the (financial) margin between attending and not attending school; if 
this is indeed the mechanism for their results, a good variable for stratification 
would be distance from the relevant cutoff. We also need to know that this same 
mechanism works in any new target setting, as discussed at the end of Section 2.3. 
Third, we need to be explicit about causal structure, even if that means more 
model building and more—or different—assumptions than advocates of RCTs are 
often comfortable with. We need something, some regularity or invariance, and that 
something can rarely be recovered by simply generalizing across trials. To be clear, 
modeling causal structure does not commit us to the elaborate and often incredible 
assumptions that characterize some structural modeling in economics, but there is 
no escape from thinking about the way things work; the why as well as the what. 
Fourth, to use these techniques for reweighting and stratifying, we will need 
to know more than the results of the RCT itself, for example about differences in so-
cial, economic, and cultural structures and about the joint distributions of causal 
variables, knowledge that will often only be available through observational studies. 
We will also need external information, both theoretical and empirical, to settle on 
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an informative characterization of the population enrolled in the RCT because how 
that population is described is commonly taken to be some indication of which other 
populations would yield similar results.  
Many medical and psychological journals are explicit about this. For instance, 
the rules for submission recommended by the International Committee of Medical 
Journal Editors, ICMJE (2015, 14) insist that article abstracts “Clearly describe the 
selection of observational or experimental participants (healthy individuals or pa-
tients, including controls), including eligibility and exclusion criteria and a descrip-
tion of the source population.” An RCT is conducted on a specific trial sample, some-
how drawn from a population of specific individuals. The results obtained are fea-
tures of that sample, of those very individuals at that very time, not any other popu-
lation with any different individuals that might, for example, satisfy one of the infi-
nite set of descriptions that the trial sample satisfies. If following the ICMJE advice is 
to produce warrantable extrapolation—simple or adjusted—from a trial population 
to some other, the descriptors for the trial population must be correctly chosen. As 
we have argued, they must pick out populations where the same form of equation 
(4) holds and that have approximately the same mean (or one that we know how to 
adjust) for the net effect of the support factors in the two populations. 
This same issue is confronted already in study design. Apart from special 
cases, like post hoc evaluation for payment-for-results, we are not especially con-
cerned to learn about the very individuals enrolled in the trial. Most experiments 
are, and should be, conducted with an eye to what the results can help us learn 
about other populations. This cannot be done without substantial assumptions 
about what might and what might not be relevant to the production of the outcome 
studied. So both intelligent study design and responsible reporting of study results 
involve substantial background assumptions.  
Of course, this is true for all studies. But RCTs require special conditions if 
they are to be conducted at all and especially if they are to be conducted success-
fully—for example, local agreements, compliant subjects, affordable administrators, 
multiple blinding, people competent to measure and record outcomes reliably, a set-
ting where random allocation is morally and politically acceptable, etc.—whereas 
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observational data are often more readily and widely available. In the case of RCTs, 
there is danger that these kinds of considerations have too much effect. This is espe-
cially worrisome where the features that the trial sample should have are not justi-
fied, made explicit, or subjected to serious critical review.  
The need for observational knowledge is one of many reasons why it is coun-
ter-productive to insist that RCTs are the gold standard or that some categories of 
evidence should be prioritized over others; these strategies leave us helpless in us-
ing RCTs beyond their original context. The results of RCTs must be integrated with 
other knowledge, including the practical wisdom of policymakers, if they are to be 
useable outside the context in which they were constructed.  
Contrary to much practice in medicine as well as in economics, conflicts be-
tween RCTs and observational results need to be explained, for example by refer-
ence to the different characteristics of the different populations studied in each, a 
process that will sometimes yield important evidence, including on the range of ap-
plicability of the RCT results themselves. While the validity of the RCT will some-
times provide an understanding of why the observational study found a different 
answer, there is no basis (or excuse) for the common practice of dismissing the ob-
servational study simply because it was not an RCT and therefore must be invalid. It 
is a basic tenet of scientific advance that, as collective knowledge advances, new 
findings must be able to explain and be integrated with previous results, even re-
sults that are now thought to be invalid; methodological prejudice is not an explana-
tion.  
 
2.6 Using RCTs to build and test theory 
RCT results, as with any well-established scientific claims, can be used in the famil-
iar hypothetico-deductive way to test theory.  
For example, one of the largest and most technically impressive of the devel-
opment RCTs is by Banerjee et al. (2015), which tests a ‘graduation’ program de-
signed to permanently lift extremely poor people from poverty by providing them 
with a gift of a productive asset (from guinea-pigs, (regular-) pigs, sheep, goats, or 
chickens depending on locale), training and support, and life-skills coaching, as well 
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as support for consumption, saving, and health services. The idea is that this pack-
age of aid can help people break out of poverty traps in a way that would not be pos-
sible with one intervention at a time. Comparable versions of the program were 
tested in Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, India, Pakistan, and Peru and, excepting Hon-
duras (where the chickens died) find largely positive and persistent effects—with 
similar (standardized) effect sizes—for a range of outcomes (economic, mental and 
physical health, and female empowerment). One site apart, essentially everyone ac-
cepted their assignment. Replication of positive ATEs over such a wide range of 
places certainly provides proof of concept for such a scheme. Yet Bauchet et al. 
(2015) fail to replicate the result in South India, where the control group got access 
to much the same benefits. (Heckman, et al. (2000) call this `substitution’ bias). Even 
so, the results are important because, although there is a longstanding interest in 
poverty traps, many economists have been skeptical of their existence or that they 
could be sprung by such aid-based policies. In this sense, the study is an important 
contribution to the theory of economic development; it tests a theoretical proposi-
tion and will (or should) change minds about it. 
Economists have been combining theory and randomized controlled trials in 
a variety of other ways since the early experiments. The trials help build and test 
theory and theory in turn can answer questions about new settings and populations 
that we cannot answer by simple extrapolation or generalization of the trial results. 
We will outline a few economics examples to give a sense of how the interweaving 
of theory and results can work. 
Orcutt and Orcutt (1968) laid out the inspiration for the income tax trials us-
ing a simple static theory of labor supply. According to this, people choose how to 
divide their time between work and leisure in an environment in which they receive 
a minimum G if they do not work, and where they receive an additional amount 
(1t) w for each hour they work, where w is the wage rate, and t is a tax rate. The 
trials assigned different combinations of G and t to different trial groups, so that the 
results traced out the labor supply function, allowing estimation of the parameters 
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of preferences, which could then be used in a wide range of policy calculations, for 
example to raise revenue at minimum utility loss to workers.  
 Following these early trials, there has been a continuing tradition of using 
trial results, together with the baseline data collected for the trial, to fit structural 
models that are to be used more generally. (Early examples include Moffitt (1979) 
on labor supply and Wise (1985) on housing; a more recent example is Heckman et 
al. (2013) for the Perry pre-school program. Development economics examples in-
clude Attanasio et al. (2012), Attanasio et al. (2015), Todd and Wolpin (2006), Wol-
pin (2013), and Duflo et al. (2012).) These structural models sometimes require for-
midable auxiliary assumptions on functional forms or the distributions of unobserv-
ables, but they have compensating advantages, including the ability to integrate the-
ory and evidence, to make out-of-sample predictions, and to analyze welfare, and 
the use of RCT evidence allows the relaxation of at least some of the assumptions 
that are needed for identification. In this way, the structural models borrow credi-
bility from the RCTs and in return help set the RCT results within a coherent frame-
work. Without some such interpretation, the welfare implications of RCT results can 
be problematic; knowing how people in general (let alone just people in the trial 
population) respond to some policy is rarely enough to tell whether or not they are 
made better off, Harrison (2014a, b). Traditional welfare economics draws a link 
from preferences to behavior, a link that is respected in structural work but often 
lost in the ‘what works’ literature, and without which we have no basis for inferring 
welfare from behavior. What works is not equivalent to what should be. 
 Even simple theory can do much to interpret, to extend, and to use RCT re-
sults. In both the RAND Health Experiment and negative income tax experiments, an 
immediate issue concerned the difference between short and long-run responses; 
indeed, differences between immediate and ultimate effects occur in a wide range of 
RCTs. Both health and tax RCTs aimed to discover what would happen if consum-
ers/workers were permanently faced with higher or lower prices/wages, but the tri-
als could only run for a limited period. A temporarily high tax rate on earnings is ef-
fectively a ‘fire sale’ on leisure, so that the experiment provided an opportunity to 
take a vacation and make up the earnings later, an incentive that would be absent in 
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a permanent scheme. How do we get from the short-run responses that come from 
the trial to the long-run responses that we want to know? Metcalf (1973) and Ash-
enfelter (1978) provided answers for the income tax experiments, as did Arrow 
(1975) for the Rand Health Experiment.  
Arrow’s analysis illustrates how to use both structure and observational data in 
combination with results from one setting to predict results in another. He models 
the health experiment as a two-period model in which the price of medical care is 
lowered in the first period only, and shows how to derive what we want, which is 
the response in the first period if prices were lowered by the same proportion in 
both periods. The magnitude that we want is S, the compensated price derivative of 
medical care in period 1 in the face of identical increases in 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 in both peri-
ods 1 and 2. This is equal to 𝑠11 + 𝑠12, the sum of the derivatives of period 1’s de-
mand with respect to the two prices. The trial gives only 𝑠11. But if we have post-
trial data on medical services for both treatments and controls, we can infer 𝑠21, the 
effect of the experimental price manipulation on post-experimental care. Choice the-
ory, in the form of Slutsky symmetry says that 𝑠12 = 𝑠21 and so allows Arrow to infer 
𝑠12 and thus S. He contrasts this with Metcalf’s alternative solution, which makes dif-
ferent assumptions—that two period preferences are intertemporally additive, in 
which case the long-run elasticity can be obtained from knowledge of the income 
elasticity of post-experimental medical care, which would have to come from an ob-
servational analysis.  
These two alternative approaches show how we can choose, based on our will-
ingness to make assumptions and on the data that we have, a suitable combination 
of (elementary and transparent) theoretical assumptions and observational data in 
order to adapt and use trial results. Such analysis can also help design the original 
trial by clarifying what we need to know in order to use the results of a temporary 
treatment to estimate the permanent effects that we need. Ashenfelter provides a 
third solution, noting that the two-period model is formally identical to a two-person 
model, so that we can use information on two-person labor supply to tell us about 
the dynamics. In the Rand case, internal evidence suggests that short-run and long-
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run responses were not in fact very different, but Arrow’s analysis provides an illus-
tration of how theory can form a bridge from what we get to what we want. 
 Theory can often allow us to reclassify new or unknown situations as analo-
gous to situations where we already have background knowledge. In economics, one 
frequently useful way of doing this is when the new policy can be recast as equiva-
lent to a change in the prices and incomes faced by respondents. The consequences 
of a new policy may be easier to predict if we can reduce it to equivalent changes in 
income and prices, whose effects are often well understood and well-studied. Todd 
and Wolpin (2008) and Wolpin (2013) make this point and provide examples. In the 
labor supply case, an increase in the tax rate has the same effect as a decrease in the 
wage rate, so that we can rely on previous literature to predict what will happen 
when tax rates are changed. In the case of Mexico’s PROGRESA conditional cash 
transfer program, Todd and Wolpin note that the subsidies paid to parents if their 
children go to school can be thought of as a combination of reduction in children’s 
wages and an increase in parents’ income, which allows them to predict the results 
of the conditional cash experiment with limited additional assumptions. If this 
works, as it partially does in their analysis, the trial helps consolidate previous 
knowledge and contributes to an evolving body of theory and empirical, including 
trial, evidence.  
The program of thinking about policy changes as equivalent to price and income 
changes has a long history in economics; much of rational choice theory can be so 
interpreted (see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) for many examples). When this con-
version is credible, and when a trial on some apparently unrelated topic can be 
modeled as equivalent to a change in prices and incomes, and when we can assume 
that people in different settings respond similarly to changes in prices and incomes, 
we have a readymade framework for incorporating the trial results into previous 
knowledge, as well as for extending the trial results and using them elsewhere. Of 
course, all depends on the validity and credibility of the theory; people may not in 
fact treat a tax increase as a decrease in the price of leisure, and behavioral econom-
ics is full of examples where apparently equivalent stimuli generate non-equivalent 
outcomes. The embrace of behavioral economics by many of the current generation 
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of researchers may account for their limited willingness to use conventional choice 
theory in this way. Unfortunately, behavioral economics does not yet offer a replace-
ment for the general framework of choice theory that is so useful in this regard. 
 Theory can also help with the problems we raised in the summary of Section 
1., that people who are randomized into the treatment group may refuse treatment. 
When theory is good enough to indicate how to represent the gain and losses that 
trial participants are likely to base compliance on, then analysis can sometimes help 
us adjust the trial estimates back to what we would like to know.   
 
2.6 Scaling up: using the average for populations 
Many RCTs are small-scale and local, for example in a few schools, clinics, or farms 
in a particular geographic, cultural, socio-economic setting. If successful according 
to a cost-effectiveness criterion, for example, it is a candidate for scaling-up, apply-
ing the same intervention for a much larger area, often a whole country, or some-
times even beyond, as when some treatment is considered for all relevant World 
Bank projects. Predicting the same results at scale as in the trial is a case of simple 
extrapolation. We discuss it separately, however, because it can raise special prob-
lems. The fact that the intervention might work differently at scale has long been 
noted in the economics literature, e.g. Garfinkel and Manski (1992), Heckman 
(1992), and Moffitt (1992), and is recognized in the recent review by Banerjee and 
Duflo (2009).  
In medicine, where biological interactions between people are less common 
than are social interactions in social science, they can still be important. Infectious 
diseases are a well-known example, where immunization programs affect the dy-
namics of disease transmission through herd immunity (see Fine and Clarkson 
(1986) and Manski (2013, 52)). The social and economic setting also affects how 
drugs are actually used and the same issues can arise; the distinction between effi-
cacy and effectiveness in clinical trials is in part recognition of the fact. We want 
here to emphasize the pervasiveness of such effects as well as to note again that this 
should not be taken as an argument against using RCTs but only against the idea 
that effects at scale are likely to be the same as in the trial.  
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 An example of what are often called ‘general equilibrium effects’ comes from 
agriculture. Suppose an RCT demonstrates that in the study population a new way of 
using fertilizer had a substantial positive effect on, say, cocoa yields, so that farmers 
who used the new methods saw increases in production and in incomes compared 
to those in the control group. If the procedure is scaled up to the whole country, or 
to all cocoa farmers worldwide, the price will drop, and if the demand for cocoa is 
price inelastic—as is usually thought to be the case, at least in the short run—cocoa 
farmers’ incomes will fall. Indeed, the conventional wisdom for many crops is that 
farmers do best when the harvest is small, not large. In this case, the scaled-up effect 
is opposite in sign to the trial effect. The problem is not with the trial results, which 
can be usefully incorporated into a more comprehensive market model that incor-
porates the responses estimated by the trial. The problem is only if we assume that 
the aggregate looks like the individual. That other ingredients of the aggregate 
model must come from observational studies should not be a criticism, even for 
those who favor RCTs; it is simply the price of doing serious analysis.  
 There are many possible interventions that alter supply or demand whose 
effect, in aggregate, will change a price or a wage that is held constant in the original 
RCT. Indeed, any trial that changes the quantities that people demand or supply—
including labor supply—must, as a matter of logic, affect other people because the 
new demand has to be met, or the new supply accommodated. In the language of the 
Rubin causal model, this is a failure of SUTVA, the stable unit treatment value as-
sumption. Of course, each unit may be too small to have any perceptible effect by it-
self, so SUTVA holds to a high degree of approximation in the trial, but once we ag-
gregate to the population, the effects will often be large enough to modify or reverse 
the result from the trial. Examples include that education will change the supplies of 
skilled versus unskilled labor, with implications for relative wage rates. Conditional 
cash transfers increase the demand for (and perhaps supply of) schools and clinics, 
which will change prices or waiting lines, or both. There are interactions between 
people that will operate only at scale. Giving one child a voucher to go to private 
school might improve her future, but doing so for everyone can decrease the quality 
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of education for those children who are left in the public schools (see the con-
trasting studies of Angrist et al. (2002) and Hsieh and Urquiola (2006)). Educational 
or training programs may benefit those who are treated but harm those left behind; 
Crépon et al. (2014) recognize the issue and show how to adapt an RCT to deal with 
it. 
 Much of economics is concerned with analyzing equilibria, most obviously in 
the equilibrium of supply and demand. Multiple causal mechanisms are reconciled 
by the adjustment of some variable, such as a price. RCTs will often be useful in ana-
lyzing one or other mechanism, in which the equilibrating variable is held constant, 
and the results of those RCTs can be used to analyze and predict the equilibrium ef-
fects of policies. But the results of implementing policies will often look very differ-
ent from the trial results, as in the cocoa example above. If, as is often argued, eco-
nomics is about the analysis of equilibrium, simple extrapolation of the results of an 
RCT will rarely be useful. Note that we are making no claim about the success of eco-
nomic models, either in analysis or prediction. But the analysis of equilibrium is a 
matter of logical consistency without which we are left with contradictory proposi-
tions. 
 
2.7 Drilling down: using the average for individuals 
Just as there are issues with scaling-up, it is not obvious how to use the results from 
RCTs at the level of individual units, even individual units that were included in the 
trial. A well-conducted RCT delivers an ATE for the trial population but, in general, 
that average does not apply to everyone. It is not true, for example, as argued in the 
American Medical Association’s Users’ guide to the medical literature that “if the pa-
tient would have been enrolled in the study had she been there—that is she meets 
all of the inclusion criteria and doesn’t violate any of the exclusion criteria—there is 
little question that the results are applicable” (see Guyatt et al. (1994, 60)). Even 
more misleading are the often-heard statements that an RCT with an average treat-
ment effect insignificantly different from zero has shown that the treatment works 
for no one.  
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These issues are familiar to physicians practicing evidence-based medicine 
whose guidelines require “integrating individual clinical expertise with the best 
available external clinical evidence from systematic research” Sackett et al. (1996, 
71)). Exactly what this means is unclear; physicians know much more about their 
patients than is allowed for in the ATE from the RCT (though, once again, stratifica-
tion in the trial is likely to be helpful) and they often have intuitive expertise from 
long practice that can help them identify features in a particular patient that may in-
fluence the effectiveness of a given treatment for that patient (see Horwitz (1996)). 
But there is an odd balance struck here. These judgments are deemed admissible in 
discussion with the individual patient, but they don’t add up to evidence to be made 
publicly available, with the usual cautions about credibility, by the standards 
adopted by most EBM sites.  It is also true that physicians can have prejudices and 
`knowledge’ that might be anything but. Clearly, there are situations where forcing 
practitioners to follow the average will do better, even for individual patients, and 
others where the opposite is true (see Kahneman and Klein (2009)). Horwitz et al. 
(2017) propose that medical practice should move from evidence-based medicine to 
what they call medicine-based evidence in which all individual case histories are as-
sembled and matched to provide a basis for deviation from the means of RCTs. 
 Whether or not averages are useful to individuals raises the same issue 
throughout social science research. Imagine two schools, St Joseph’s and St. Mary’s, 
both of which were included in an RCT of a classroom innovation.  The innovation is 
successful on average, but should the schools adopt it? Should St Mary’s be influ-
enced by a previous attempt in St Joseph’s that was judged a failure? Many would 
dismiss this experience as anecdotal and ask how St Joseph’s could have known that 
it was a failure without benefit of ‘rigorous’ evidence. Yet if St Mary’s is like St Jo-
seph’s, with a similar mix of pupils, a similar curriculum, and similar academic 
standing, might not St Joseph’s experience be more relevant to what might happen 
at St Mary’s than is the positive average from the RCT? And might it not be a good 
idea for the teachers and governors of St Mary’s to go to St Joseph’s and find out 
what happened and why? They may be able to observe the mechanism of the failure, 
if such it was, and figure out whether the same problems would apply for them, or 
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whether they might be able to adapt the innovation to make it work for them, per-
haps even more successfully than the positive average in the trial.  
Once again, these questions are unlikely to be easily answered in practice; 
but, as with exportability, there is no serious alternative to trying. Assuming that the 
average works for you will often be wrong, and it will at least sometimes be possible 
to do better; for instance, by judicious use of theory, reasoning by analogy, process 
tracing, identification of mechanisms, sub-group analysis, or recognizing various 
symptoms that a causal pathway is possible, as in Bradford-Hill (1965) (see also 
Cartwright (2015), Reiss (2017), and Humphreys and Jacobs (2017). As in the medi-
cal case, the advice to individual schools often lacks specificity. For example, the U.S. 
Institute of Education Sciences has provided a “user-friendly” guide to practices sup-
ported by rigorous evidence (U.S. Department of Education (2003)). The advice, 
which is similar to recommendations throughout evidence-based social and health 
policy literature, is that the intervention be demonstrated effective through well-de-
signed RCTs in more than one site and that “the trials should demonstrate the inter-
vention’s effectiveness in school settings similar to yours” (2003, 17). No opera-
tional definition of “similar” is provided. 
 
Conclusions  
It is useful to respond to two challenges that are often put to us, one from medicine 
and one from social science. The medical challenge is, “If you are being prescribed a 
new drug, wouldn’t you want it to have been through an RCT?” The second (related) 
challenge is, “OK, you have highlighted some of the problems with RCTs, but other 
methods have all of those problems, plus problems of their own.” We believe that we 
have answered both of these in the paper but that it is helpful to recapitulate.  
The medical challenge is about you, a specific person, so that one answer 
would be that you may be different from the average, and you are entitled to and 
ought to ask about theory and evidence about whether it will work for you. This 
would be in the form of a conversation between you and your physician, who knows 
a lot about you. You would want to know how this class of drug is supposed to work 
and whether that mechanism is likely to work for you. Is there any evidence from 
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other patients, especially patients like you, with your condition and in your circum-
stances, or are there suggestions from theory? What scientific work has been done 
to identify what support factors matter for success with this kind of drug? If the only 
information available is from the pharmaceutical company whose priors and finan-
cial interests might have somehow influenced the results, an RCT might seem like a 
good idea. But even then, and although knowledge of the mean effect among some 
group is certainly of value, you might give little weight to an RCT whose participants 
are selected in the way they were selected in the trial, or where there is little infor-
mation about whether the outcomes are relevant to you. Recall that many new drugs 
are prescribed ‘off-label’, for a purpose for which they were not tested, and beyond 
that, that many new drugs are administered in the absence of an RCT because you 
are actually being enrolled in one. For patients whose last chance is to participate in 
a trial of some new drug, this is exactly the sort of conversation you should have 
with your physician (followed by one asking her to reveal whether you are in the ac-
tive arm, so that you can switch if not), and such conversations need to take place 
for all prescriptions that are new to you. In these conversations, the results of an 
RCT may have marginal value. If your physician tells you that she endorses evidence-
based medicine, and that the drug will work for you because an RCT has shown that 
‘it works’, it is time to find a physician who knows that you and the average are not 
the same. 
The second challenge claims that other methods are always dominated by an 
RCT. That, as one of our referees challenged us, echoing Churchill, “that RCTs are 
horrible, except when compared to the alternatives.” We believe that this challenge 
is not well-formulated. Dominated for answering what question, for what purposes? 
The chief advantage of the RCT is that it can, if well-conducted, give an unbiased es-
timate of an ATE in a study (trial) sample and thus provide evidence that the treat-
ment caused the outcome in some individuals in that sample. Note that ‘well-con-
ducted”’ rules out all of the things that almost always occur in practice, including at-
trition, intentional lack of blinding or unintentional unblinding, and other post-ran-
domization confounding and selection biases (see Hernán et al. (2013)). If an unbi-
ased estimate of the ATE is what you want and there’s little background knowledge 
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available and the price is right, then an RCT may be the best choice.  As to other 
questions, the RCT result can be part—but usually only a small part—of the defense 
of (a) a general claim, (b) a claim that the treatment will cause that outcome for 
some other individuals, (c) a claim about what the ATE will be in some other popula-
tion, or even (d) a claim about something very different that the RCT results tests. 
But they do little for these enterprises on their own. What is the best overall pack-
age of research work for tackling these questions—most cost-effective and most 
likely to produce correct results—depends on what we know and what different 
kinds of research will cost. 
There are examples where an RCT does better than an observational study, 
and these seem to be the cases that come to mind for defenders of RCTs. For exam-
ple, regressions of whether people who get Medicaid do better or worse than people 
with private insurance are vitiated by gross differences in the other characteristics 
of the two populations. But it is a long step from that to saying that an RCT can solve 
the problem, let alone that it is the only way to solve the problem. It will not only be 
expensive per subject, but it can only enroll a selected and almost certainly unrepre-
sentative study sample, it can be run only temporarily, and the recruitment to the 
experiment will necessarily be different from recruitment in a scheme that is per-
manent and open to the full qualified population. The subjects in the trial are likely 
to find out whether or not they are in the treatment arm, either because the treat-
ment itself prevents blinding, or because side-effects or differences in protocol re-
veal their status; subjects may differentially leave the trial given this information. 
None of this removes the blemishes of the observational study, but there are many 
methods of mitigating its difficulties, so that, in the end, an observational study with 
credible corrections and a more relevant and much larger study sample—today of-
ten the complete population of interest through administrative records, where 
blinding and selection issues are absent—may provide a better estimate.  
The medical community seems slow and reluctant to embrace other reliable 
methods of causal inference. The Academy of Medical Sciences (2017, 4) in its re-
view of sources of evidence on the efficacy and effectiveness of medicine agrees with 
us that “The type of evidence, and the methods needed to analyse that evidence, will 
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depend on the research question being asked.”  Still, it does not mention methods 
widely used in social and economic sciences such as instrumental variables, econo-
metric modelling, deduction from theory, causal Bayesian nets, process tracing, or 
qualitative comparative analysis. Each of these has its strengths and weaknesses, 
each allows causal inference though not all allow an estimate of effect size, and 
each—as with every method—requires casual background knowledge as input in 
order to draw causal conclusions. But in the face of widespread unbinding and the 
increasing cost of RCTs, it is wasteful not to make use of these. Everything has to be 
judged on a case -by-case basis.  There is no valid argument for a lexicographic pref-
erence for RCTs.  
There is also an important line of enquiry that goes, not only beyond RCTs, 
but beyond the ‘method of differences’ that is common to RCTs, regressions, or any 
form of controlled or uncontrolled comparison. The hypothetico-deductive method 
confronts theory-based deductions with the data—either observational or experi-
mental. As noted above, economists routinely use theory to tease out a new implica-
tion that can be taken to the data, and there are also good examples in medicine. One 
is Bleyer and Welch (2012)’s demonstration of the limited effectiveness of mam-
mography screening; the data do not show the compensating changes in early and 
late stage breast-cancer incidence that would accompany the large-scale introduc-
tion of successful screening. This is a topic where RCTs have been indecisive and 
controversial, if only because they are 2030 years old and therefore outdated rela-
tive to the current rapidly-changing environment (see Marmot et al. (2013)). Such 
uses of the hypothetico-deductive method are different from what seems to be usu-
ally meant by an ‘observational study,’ in which groups are compared with question-
able controls for confounders, and where randomization, in spite of its inadequacies, 
is arguably better. 
RCTs are the ultimate in non-parametric estimation of average treatment ef-
fects in trial samples because they make so few assumptions about heterogeneity, 
causal structure, choice of variables, and functional form. RCTs are often convenient 
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ways to introduce experimenter-controlled variance—if you want to see what hap-
pens, then kick it and see, twist the lion’s tail—but note that many experiments, in-
cluding many of the most important (and Nobel Prize winning) experiments in eco-
nomics, do not and did not use randomization (see Harrison (2013), Svorencik 
(2015)). But the credibility of the results, even internally, can be undermined by un-
balanced covariates and by excessive heterogeneity in responses, especially when 
the distribution of effects is asymmetric, where inference on means can be hazard-
ous. Ironically, the price of the credibility in RCTs is that we can only recover the 
mean of the distribution of treatment effects, and that only for the trial sample. Yet, 
in the presence of outliers in treatment effects or in covariates, reliable inference on 
means is difficult. And randomization in and of itself does nothing unless the details 
are right; purposive selection into the experimental population, like purposive se-
lection into and out of assignment, undermines inference in just the same way as 
does selection in observational studies. Lack of blinding, whether of participants, in-
vestigators, data collectors, or analysts, undermines inference, akin to a failure of ex-
clusion restrictions in instrumental variable analysis.  
The lack of structure can be seriously disabling when we try to use RCT re-
sults outside of a few contexts, such as program evaluation, hypothesis testing, or 
establishing proof of concept. Beyond that, the results cannot be used to help make 
predictions beyond the trial sample without more structure, without more prior in-
formation, and without having some idea of what makes treatment effects vary from 
place to place or time to time. There is no option but to commit to some causal 
structure if we are to know how to use RCT evidence out of the original context. 
Simple generalization and simple extrapolation do not cut the mustard. This is true 
of any study, experimental or observational. But observational studies are familiar 
with, and routinely work with, the sort of assumptions that RCTs claim to (but do 
not) avoid, so that if the aim is to use empirical evidence, any credibility advantage 
that RCTs have in estimation is no longer operative. And because RCTs tell us so lit-
tle about why results happen, they have a disadvantage over studies that use a wider 
range of prior information and data to help nail down mechanisms.  
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Yet once that commitment has been made, RCT evidence can be extremely 
useful, pinning down part of a structure, helping to build stronger understanding 
and knowledge, and helping to assess welfare consequences. As our examples show, 
this can often be done without committing to the full complexity of what are often 
thought of as structural models. Yet without the structure that allows us to place 
RCT results in context, or to understand the mechanisms behind those results, not 
only can we not transport whether `it works’ elsewhere, but we cannot do one of the 
standard tasks of economics, which is to say whether the intervention is actually 
welfare improving. Without knowing why things happen and why people do things, 
we run the risk of worthless casual (`fairy story’) causal theorizing and have given 
up on one of the central tasks of economics and other social sciences.  
We must back away from the refusal to theorize, from the exultation in our 
ability to handle unlimited heterogeneity, and actually SAY something. Perhaps par-
adoxically, unless we are prepared to make assumptions, and to say what we know, 
making statements that will be incredible to some, the credibility of the RCT does us 
very little good.  
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Appendix: Monte Carlo experiment for an RCT with outliers 
In this illustrative example, there is a parent population each member of which has his or 
her own treatment effect; these are continuously distributed with a shifted lognormal distri-
bution with zero mean so that the population ATE is zero. The individual treatment effects 
b  are distributed so that  b + e
0.5 ∼L(0,1) , for standardized lognormal distribution L. In 
the absence of treatment, everyone in the sample records zero, so the sample average treat-
ment effect in any one trial is simply the mean outcome among the n treatments. For values 
of n equal to 25, 50, 100, 200, and 500 we draw from the parent population 100 trial sam-
ples each of size 2n; with five values of n, this gives us 500 trial samples in all; because of 
sampling the true ATE’s in each trial sample will not be zero. For each of these 500 samples, 
we randomize into n controls and n treatments, estimate the ATE and its estimated t–value 
(using the standard two-sample t–value, or equivalently, by running a regression with ro-
bust t–values), and then repeat 1,000 times, so we have 1,000 ATE estimates and t–values 
for each of the 500 trial samples. These allow us to assess the distribution of ATE estimates 
and their nominal t–values for each trial.  
The results are shown in Table A1. Each row corresponds to a sample size. In each 
row, we show the results of 100,000 individual trials, composed of 1,000 replications on 
each of the 100 trial (experimental) samples. The columns are averaged over all 100,000 tri-
als.  
 
 
Table A1: RCTs with skewed treatment effects 
Sample size Mean of ATE 
estimates 
Mean of nominal t–
values 
Fraction null re-
jected (percent) 
25 
50 
0.0268 
0.0266 
–0.4274 
–0.2952 
13.54 
11.20 
 72 
100 –0.0018 –0.2600 8.71 
200 0.0184 –0.1748 7.09 
500 –0.0024 –0.1362 6.06 
Note: 1,000 randomizations on each of 100 draws of the trial sample randomly drawn from 
a lognormal distribution of treatment effects shifted to have a zero mean. 
The last column shows the fractions of times the null that is true in the population is 
rejected in the trial samples and is our key result. When there are only 50 treatments and 
50 controls (row 2), the (true) null is rejected 11.2 percent of the time, instead of the 5 per-
cent that we would like and expect if we were unaware of the problem. When there are 500 
units in each arm, the rejection rate is 6.06 percent, much closer to the nominal 5 percent.  
 
Figure A1: Estimates of an ATE with an outlier in the trial sample 
Figure A1 illustrates the estimated ATEs from an extreme trial sample from the simulations 
in the second row with 100 observations in total; the histogram shows the 1,000 estimates 
of the ATE for that trial sample. This trial sample has a single large outlying treatment effect 
of 48.3; the mean (s.d.) of the other 99 observations is –0.51 (2.1); when the outlier is in the 
treatment group, we get the observations around right-hand mode, when it is in the control 
group, we get the left-hand mode.  
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